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 Introduction1 
Over the years, there has been increased attention, in academic litera-
ture as well as in international trade fora, towards trade barriers caused 
by national regulations and product standards (Vogel 1995; Sykes 
1995, 1999; Egan 2001; Josling et al. 2004; Fliess and Kim 2008; 
Djelic and Sahlin 2012; Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013; Jupille et al. 
2013). One of the core concerns raised is how trade can be facilitated 
without compromising legitimate objectives such as health protection. 
This paper addresses this question by analysing two ‘instruments’ 
available under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement), which may be 
used to solve regulatory conflicts and remove trade restrictions: equiva-
lence2 and dispute settlement. The main research questions are: What 
characterizes the SPS regulation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in world 
food trade? Under what conditions can the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism (hard governance) and equivalence agreements (soft gov-
ernance), be effective in solving conflicts and removing trade re-
strictions while at the same time safeguarding legitimate (health) con-
cerns? The paper focuses on trade relations between the EU and the 
United States (U.S.). The EU and the U.S. are major players in world 
(food) trade, both have experience from using equivalence agreements 
as instruments to facilitate trade, and they appear by far as the most 
frequent complainants/respondents in WTO disputes (WTO 2015a). 
The paper is based on public documents, statistics on disputes and 
NTBs, trade statistics, literature, as well as on interviews and findings 
from a separate study of EU’s “toolbox of instruments” in trade facilita-
tion (WTO 2002a, 2002b; Veggeland 2006)3. The aim of the paper is 
                                                          
1  This paper has been prepared as part of the project “Non-tariff barriers, food safety 
and international food trade”, managed by NUPI (Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs). Frode Veggeland (University of Oslo and NILF) has been main re-
sponsible for writing and preparing the paper. Stine Evensen Sørbye (NILF) has 
prepared and systematized data presented in Figures 4-8, Table 2 and parts of An-
nex 2, and has provided valuable comments to the whole paper as such. The au-
thors would like to thank project leader Arne Melchior at NUPI and Maren E. Bache 
at NUPI, as well as Martin S. Time at the University of Oslo, for valuable comments 
to earlier versions of this paper. We also would like to thank the participants at the 
Final Conference of the project “Non-tariff barriers, food safety and international 
food trade”, arranged by NUPI in Oslo, Norway 26-27 February 2015 for comments 
to the paper presentation. 
2  “Equivalence” and “equivalency” have the same meaning and are used inter-
changeably in this paper. 
3  The interviews for the study presented in Veggeland (2006) were made at a time 
when equivalence was much debated in the WTO, and furthermore when disputes 
on SPS issues were high on the agenda. The interviews were made with officials 
Transatlantic Governance in Food Trade 5 
twofold. First, we investigate empirically international experience with 
non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) in the SPS area (food safety), as well 
as disputes on SPS measures being brought up in the WTO. Second, we 
analyse the SPS Agreement’s provisions on equivalence and dispute 
settlement and look at how these two trade-facilitation4 tools have 
been used in conflict-resolution by studying two cases both involving 
the EU and the U.S.: a) the ‘beef hormones’ dispute, and b) the veteri-
nary equivalence agreement (VEA). Based on the case studies we ana-
lyse the conditions under which the WTO’s dispute settlement mecha-
nism and equivalence agreements respectively, can be effective in-
struments in world trade governance, including their effectiveness in 
conflict-resolution and trade facilitation. The results from this study are 
thus highly relevant for the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive 
trade agreement (TTIP: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship) between the EU and the U.S., where food trade governance and 
regulatory issues play a prominent role. 
                                                          
from the European Commission’s DG SANCO (Directorate General for Health and 
Consumers), DG Trade, DG Agriculture and DG Enterprise; officials from the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
4  This paper uses a broad understanding of “trade facilitation”, i.e. all measures, 
tools, instruments etc. that can be used to facilitate trade. This is not to be con-
fused with “trade facilitation” narrowly defined as “…simplification of trade proce-
dures in order to move goods in cross-border trade more efficiently”, which became 
a topic of discussion at the WTO's Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 
1996 (referred to as one of the “Singapore issues”), which was moved forward in 
the WTO’s so-called “Bali Package” of 2013, and in that context was strictly linked 
to GATT Articles V, VIII and X (Staples 2004; WTO 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
 Background: the SPS Agreement 
and non-tariff barriers to food trade 
Non-Tariff Barriers to trade (NTBs) refer to a large number of trade re-
strictions (other than tariffs) that emanate from domestic measures 
such as product and production methods requirements, documentation 
requirements, quantitative restrictions, prohibitions, custom proce-
dures and fees etc. that make importation or exportation of goods and 
services difficult and/or costly (Fliess and Kim 2008; Van den Bossche 
and Zdouc 2013). In the context of the WTO, the core question is 
whether these measures unnecessary or arbitrarily restrict trade (Jack-
son 1997: 194). NTBs can be defined broadly (often done by proponent 
of trade liberalization) with the aim of strengthening the ability of pro-
ducers to challenge regulatory policies of trading partners (Vogel 1995: 
14). However, NTBs can also be defined narrowly (often done be pro-
ponents of stricter regulatory standards) with the aim of preserving 
nation-states’ ability to maintain strict regulations and in some cases to 
impose them on trading partners (ibid.). Thus, in bilateral and multilat-
eral trade settings, the debate over NTBs is characterized by the ques-
tion of how to justify domestic regulatory policies that impede on trade, 
as well as the question of identifying solutions to how trade can be fa-
cilitated without compromising the (legitimate) objectives and con-
cerns that is used to justify NTBs. 
Domestic food regulations and standards are not deemed as NTBs 
per se – the adoption of risk-based regulations and standards is neces-
sary and important to address legitimate health concerns. However, 
because these measures often have negative effects on cross-border 
trade, they also appear as an important group of NTBs in world trade 
(Vogel 1995: 14; Josling et al. 2004: 28-31). GATT (General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade) – the predecessor to the WTO –   recognized food 
regulations and standards as a group of measures that increasingly 
(and according to many: unjustifiably) impeded on world trade. Thus, a 
separate agreement (the SPS Agreement) covering these measures, was 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986-94). Simi-
larly, the EU identified NTBs in food and agriculture trade as a serious 
challenge for reaching the objective of a well-functioning internal mar-
ket – thus, harmonization and mutual recognition of food regulations 
and standards became a major part of the EU’s Single Market program 
of the 1980s and 1990s (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Vos 1999; Egan 
2001; Ugland and Veggeland 2006). 
The WTO’s SPS Agreement “applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade” 
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(Article 1). SPS measures are defined as any measures used to protect 
human, animal and plant life or health.5 Measures to ensure food safe-
ty is thus at the core of what is covered by the agreement. Basically, the 
drafting of the SPS Agreement was about setting up trade rules to avoid 
discriminating and unjustifiable NTBs in food and agriculture trade. 
The agreement entered into force simultaneously with the establish-
ment of the WTO – on January 1 1995. The SPS Agreement gives the 
WTO members the “…right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement” (Article 2.1). However,  the “…Members shall ensure 
that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on 
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence (…)” (Article 2.2). These provisions illustrate the so-called 
proportionality principle, which in international trade law serves as 
guidance for states to strike the correct balance between a (trade) re-
striction imposed by a regulatory measure and the severity of the objec-
tive this measure is meant to achieve (Vos 1999; Abott and Snidal 
2000; Shaffer and Pollack 2002).  
The SPS Agreement thus gives WTO members the right to impose 
NTBs, but under certain specified conditions. A basic requirement is 
that the (trade-restricting) measure needs to be based on science. The 
Agreement also specifies a number of instruments that can be used to 
avoid and/or remove NTBs: the WTO members may harmonize their 
regulations on as wide basis as possible by basing their national 
measures on recognized international standards (Article 3); they can 
accept the SPS measures of other members as equivalent, even if these 
measures differ from their own (Article 4); and they can eventually 
bring a complaint to the WTO’s dispute settlement system with the aim 
of using legal instruments to “force” another member to remove its 
trade restricting SPS measure (Article 11).6 The main focus of this pa-
per is on the last two of these instruments: equivalence and dispute 
settlement; the first is about regulatory dialogue, mutual acceptance of 
differences between regulatory systems, and gradual regulatory con-
vergence (c.f. “soft governance”); the second is about using the power-
ful dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO to “force” another mem-
                                                          
5  The definition of sanitary and phytosanitary measures is included in Annex A of the 
SPS Agreement, which among other things operationalize SPS measures as “…all 
relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter 
alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, 
certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant re-
quirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials 
necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical 
methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging 
and labelling requirements directly related to food safety”. 
6  Full texts of SPS provisions on equivalence (Art. 4) and dispute settlement (Art. 11) 
are included in Annex 1. 
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ber to change its trade-restrictive (regulatory) measure – or, if the re-
spondent refuses to do this, to achieve mutually-acceptable compensa-
tion, or if they even fail to reach such an agreement, to impose retalia-
tory measures authorized by the WTO (c.f. “hard governance”). 
 Analytical framework: ‘soft’ vs. 
‘hard’ governance in world trade 
NTBs are generally caused by differences in national regulations. In 
this paper, ‘regulation’ generally refers to some sort of public control 
(through efforts made by state agencies) over valued activities which 
have been set out to achieve stated public goals, such as health and 
consumer protection, protecting the environment and increasing the 
welfare of citizens (Meier 1985; Selznick 1985: 363; Hood 1997; Jor-
dana and Levi-Faur 2004). As policy-makers and regulators have real-
ized that NTBs stand in the way for trade liberalization efforts, they 
have developed a set of governance tools, which can be used to elimi-
nate NTBs. Equivalence and dispute settlement can be viewed as two 
types of governance tools used to remove trade barriers caused by regu-
latory differences (“regulatory governance”). We define the former as a 
“soft governance” tool and the latter as a “hard governance” tools; c.f. 
also soft vs. hard regulation and soft vs. hard law (Abott and Snidal 
2000; Sisson and Marginson 2001; May 2002; Jacobsson 2004; Mörth 
2004; Footer 2008; Lobel 2012; Shaffer and Pollack 2010, 2012). 
Moreover, in this paper we analyze these tools as part of the transat-
lantic governance involving food trade relations between the EU and 
U.S. (Pollack and Shaffer 2001). 
Hard governance involves the use of mandatory rules and agree-
ments (hard law), hierarchical authority and power, and formalized 
enforcement and compliance mechanisms, including the use of sanc-
tions and retaliatory measures in cases of non-compliance (Abott and 
Snidal 2000; Shaffer and Pollack 2010). Soft governance involves al-
ternative and less binding means to social control than hard govern-
ance (Shaffer 2002; Borras 2004; Caporaso 2006; Dunoff and Pollack 
2012). Examples of soft governance mechanisms are non-binding 
commitments (soft law), voluntary coordination, training programmes, 
information exchange and confidence building initiatives between sci-
entists and regulators from different countries. These mechanisms in-
volve voluntariness and are aimed at creating common understanding 
of rules and objectives and at creating a platform for regulatory cooper-
ation and convergence. Soft governance mechanisms are believed to 
reduce tensions between regulatory systems and, in the context of 
NTBs, to remove trade restrictions, i.e. minimizing trade barriers 
caused by regulatory differences. Equivalence agreements can be 
deemed as one particular soft governance tool. Determination of equiv-
alence means that the involved parties accept that rules are different as 
long as it is possible to determine that the rules fulfil some commonly 
stated objective in a satisfactory way (Elvestad and Veggeland 2004, 
Frode Veggeland and Stine Evensen Sørbye 
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2005; Veggeland 2006; WTO 2002a). Thus, the concept of equivalence 
refers to the “likeness” (not “sameness”) of different rules with regard 
to some predetermined parameter. Equivalence assessments thus imply 
the judgment of different regulations as equal based on their ability to 
achieve the same objectives. The achievement of equivalence allows 
trade to flow freely within the areas covered by an equivalence agree-
ment while at the same time allowing for differences between national 
regulations to persist. Equivalence assessment may thus be considered 
as a soft approach to regulation and trade facilitation (at least “soft” 
when compared to mandatory “hard law”) inasmuch as it allows for a 
continuation of regulatory differences and that it involves voluntari-
ness and mutual understanding more than the use of hierarchical au-
thority and force.  
When applied in a world trade setting, equivalence assessments are 
normally part of an international agreement (“equivalence agreement”) 
or they are used on a case-to case basis through individual decisions on 
the “likeness” of other countries’ individual regulations (“equivalence 
judgements”) (WTO 2002a; Veggeland 2006). Focus is here on “equiv-
alence agreements”, which are more ambitious attempts at mutually 
facilitating trade between two or more trading partners (Becker 1999). 
Table 1 below summarizes the categories of soft and hard governance 
tools when used to eliminate barriers to trade. Even though ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ governance can be contrasted in this way, the use of these tools 
will often be more of a matter of degree than of either-or. In practise 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ governance may supplement and complement each 
other. Moreover, both of these governance tools have limitations as to 
how effective they are in removing trade restrictions and facilitating 
trade. The question is under what conditions they are most likely to 
facilitate trade. Normally, soft governance will be used as a supplement 
to hard governance/hard law. The effectiveness of soft governance 
moreover relies on economic incentives (there are gains to be made), as 
well as on social control, peer pressure and naming and shaming. Fur-
thermore, building confidence, faith and trust between regulators is 
fundamental to the effectiveness of soft governance. According to the 
logic of soft governance, if there is sufficient trust between different 
national regulatory systems, conflicts on NTBs will be solved through 
dialogue and informal consultations – formal sanction-mechanisms 
may thus become superfluous. This contrasts to hard governance 
which heavily relies on formal sanction-mechanisms in cases of non-
compliance.  
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Table 1: Methods to eliminate barriers to trade: soft and hard governance7 
 
Category Conditions and instruments 
HARD GOVERNANCE 
(full compliance) 
Compliance mandatory – hard law 
Tendency to focus on specific rights and 
obligations 
Use of formal compliance mechanisms – 
need for formal authority and power in 
enforcement 
Formal compliance mechanisms through 
sanctioning options 
Respect for rules – juridical obligations 
Options for local deviations prohibited 
Focus on final result 
Full counteraction of NTBs 
  
SOFT GOVERNANCE 
(partial compliance) 
Compliance voluntary – soft law 
Tendency to focus on general principles 
Judging different regulations as equal 
based on their ability to achieve the same 
objectives – regulatory dialogue and need 
for high degree of mutual credibility and 
trust 
Informal compliance mechanisms through 
open-ended processes, “naming and 
shaming”, benchmarking and peer group 
audit, ‘moral-suasion’ 
Common understanding of rules – politi-
cal obligations 
 Local deviations accepted 
Focus on process 
Partial counteraction of NTBs 
 
Hard governance is assumed to create little room for flexibility and dis-
cretion when it comes to compliance. Moreover, it is heavily based on 
the assumption that actors (including trading nations) act according to 
the logic of consequences, i.e. they base their actions – implicit or ex-
plicit – on a cost-benefit analysis (March and Olsen 1989, 2006). Sub-
sequently, they will act on the basis of fixed preferences and positions 
in their trade relations. Thus, the effectiveness of hard governance is 
depending on distribution of power, as well as on institutional con-
straints that shape action, i.e. formal constraints (established rules), 
informal constraints (social norms) and enforcement mechanisms 
(North 1990:3). Thus, the assumption is that trade conflicts and dis-
                                                          
7  Table 1 is inspired by the tables presented in Egan (2001:70) and Sisson and Mar-
ginson (2001: 4), but has been supplemented by specifying the method of equiva-
lence assessments as a soft governance tool (Elvestad and Veggeland 2004, 2005; 
Veggeland 2006). 
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putes will be solved through the use of power and force and within in-
stitutional constraints that are external to the involved actors and that 
the degree of compliance is depending on how powerful the enforce-
ment mechanisms are. Moreover, according to this perspective, strong 
nation-states will compromise and comply only when fundamental 
interests are not overrun (Moravcsik 1998). Following from this, the 
assumption is that dispute settlement will not be effective when fun-
damental interests are at stake; the institutional constraints in interna-
tional relations are not assumed to be strong enough to force powerful 
states to comply with international rules and change their positions 
when these positions are based on basic and important national inter-
ests. 
Soft governance on the other side, is to a larger extent based on the 
logic of appropriateness, which means that “…ambiguity or conflict in 
rules is typically resolved not by shifting to a logic of consequences and 
rational calculation, but by trying to clarify the rules, make distinc-
tions, determine what the situation is and what definition ‘fits’ ” 
(March and Olsen 1989: 161; March and Olsen 2006). Soft governance 
opens up for more flexibility and leeway when it comes to compliance – 
often a core element of cooperative regulatory arrangements involving 
sovereign states (Jacobsson 2004; Nicolaodis and Shaffer 2005; Footer 
2008; Abott and Snidal 2000, 2009, 2013). The assumption is that 
positions and preferences may be shaped trough interactions involving 
politicians, bureaucrats, regulators, scientists, as well as business, and 
thus that soft governance to a higher degree allows for participants to 
convince each other to change positions by letting the “best argument” 
shape outcomes. Transgovernmentalism and transnational regulatory 
governance are terms used for such interactions (Slaughter 2004; 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, 2012). Conflicts and disputes are 
assumed to be solved by creating common understanding about the 
issues at hand through interactive processes. Thus, even though it may 
be resource-demanding and time-consuming, soft governance is as-
sumed to contribute to stable and effective conflict management – by 
establishing common understanding of the issues at hand, which may 
prove difficult within hard governance. The assumption is that in situa-
tions when positions are locked and interests are strong, the use of 
“soft instruments” may change mind-sets and preferences thus con-
tributing to effective compliance and conflict-resolution. 
The two modes of governance – as presented here – are ideal types. 
In practice we will find elements of both in international trade rela-
tions. However, we will nevertheless, apply this analytical framework 
as a basis for identifying some core conditions that allow for different 
Figure2: Food imports 2000-2013 (in mill. U.S. dollar– non-indexed 
figures)modes of governance to be effective. 
 World food trade, NTBs and trans-
atlantic relations 
Figure 1 below shows that from 2000 until 2013, the total value of 
world food trade increased more than 330 %. In 2013, the value of 
world food trade was about 8 % of all world commodity trade. The in-
crease in the value of food trade is illustrated in figures 1 and 2.8  
 
 
Figure1: Food exports 2000-2013 (in mill. U.S. dollar – non-indexed figures) 
(Source: WTO’s International trade and market access data base).  
 
 
 
Figure2: Food imports 2000-2013 (in mill. U.S. dollar– non-indexed figures) 
(Source: WTO’s International trade and market access data base). 
                                                          
8  In the WTO trade statistics, “food” is defined as: food and live animals; beverages 
and tobacco; animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; oilseeds and oleaginous 
fruit (SITC sections 0, 1, 4 and division 22). 
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Figure 1 shows that the EU-28 has had a stronger increase in its food 
export value than the U.S. since the 2000 (298% vs. 260%). The EU 
generally appear as a major player in world trade and had in 2013 a 
share of almost 40 % of the value of all world food trade (exports and 
imports).9 Figure 2 shows a stronger increase in the EU’s food imports 
than for the U.S. The increase in total food imports 2000-2013 was 283 
% for the EU-28 and 239% for the U.S.  
 
Figure3: Food trade between the EU-28 and the U.S. 2000-2013 (in mill. U.S. 
dollar– non-indexed figures)  
(Source: WTO’s International trade and market access data base). 
 
Figure 3 shows the value of food trade between the EU and the U.S. 
2000-2013. Food trade amounts to about 5% of all commodity trade 
between the EU and the U.S. The value of food exports from the EU to 
the U.S. increased by 215% from 2000 to 2013 – the value of U.S. food 
exports to the EU increased by only 182%. These figures illustrate both 
that food trade is an important component of world trade and that the 
EU and the U.S. are among the world’s biggest food exporters as well as 
food importers. Thus, the roles of the EU and the U.S. in adopting trade-
restricting measures affecting imports, as well as their roles in chal-
lenging other countries’ trade restricting measures, have potentially a 
big impact on world food trade governance. 
In this paper we focus in particular on non-tariff barriers to trade 
and we moreover analyze mechanisms or tools (dispute settlement and 
equivalence) that can be used to remove or reduce the negative trade 
effects of such barriers. As tariffs over the years have been considerably 
reduced, the significance of other trade barriers – such as NTBs – has 
                                                          
9  The value of food exports and imports for EU 28 also include intra-EU trade. The 
figures nevertheless illustrate the significance of EU countries’ involvement in the 
total of world food trade transactions (more information about the figures is found 
on WTO’s International trade and market access data base). 
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increased. We focus on a particular group of NTBs: trade-restricting 
SPS measures. Under the SPS Agreement, the WTO members are re-
quired to notify each other, through the WTO Secretariat, of “any new 
or changed sanitary and phytosanitary requirements which affect 
trade” (WTO 2015a). Every member has also been required to set up so-
called called “Enquiry Points” to respond to requests for information 
about trade-affecting SPS measures, including how these measures are 
applied and justified under WTO rules. To illustrate the increasing im-
portance of trade-affecting SPS measures, we have included in Figure 4 
the number of SPS measures that the WTO members have notified to 
the WTO between 1995 and 2012. “Normal measures” are measures 
that WTO members implement on a routine-basis. “Emergency mea-
sures” are measures where member state governments may “act with-
out delay, but must immediately notify other Members, through the 
WTO Secretariat” (WTO 2015a). This may for example be relevant in 
cases where there is a major outbreak of a food-borne disease in anoth-
er member state.  
Figure 4 below shows that in the first three years after the SPS 
Agreement entered into force, there were less than 300 notifications 
each year. For the last three years there were more than 800 notifica-
tions each year. All of these measures are assumed to affect trade. 
Thus, figure 4 illustrates the increased potential for SPS measures to 
have a trade-restricting effect on world trade.  
 
Figure4: Number of SPS notifications to the WTO 1995-2012  
(Source: the SPS Committee’s yearly reports on circulated Documents and 
notifications). 
 
The EU is of great importance when it comes to SPS measures, as a ma-
jor market for food exporters as well as a major exporter of food to other 
markets. According to Aisbett and Pearson (2010: 8), the EU accounts 
for more than 12 % of all SPS notifications between 1996 and 2010, 
whereas the U.S. accounts for more than 6 %. Moreover, as of Novem-
ber 2014, the EU had 73 ongoing SPS cases on a bilateral basis with 
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other countries concerning SPS measures that impact on EU exports. 
Table 2 below shows the number of SPS cases (73) on which the EU has 
raised its concerns bilaterally (i.e. not necessarily as part of the WTO’s 
dispute settlement procedures) – allocated on the respondent coun-
tries.  
 
Table 2: Ongoing bilateral SPS cases as of November 2014 – EU as complain-
ant 
Countries where the disputed SPS measures were 
implemented 
Number of SPS cases 
per country 
Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine   
1 
Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, Uruguay, Venezuela 2 
Brazil, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Russia, South 
Korea 
3 
Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, United 
States 
4 
China 5 
Mexico 7 
Total of bilateral SPS cases 73 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade market access data base. 
 
Moreover, of a total of 43 WTO disputes between 1995 and November 
2014 involving the SPS Agreement, the EU has been involved in 14 
disputes ( 5 as complainant and 9 as respondent), whereas the U.S. has 
been involved in 19 disputes (11 as complainant and 8 as respondent) 
(see Annex 2). Some of these cases have been going on for many years 
without any final conclusion being reached. One of the most famous 
disputes concerning SPS issues is the “Beef-hormones” case between 
the EU and the U.S., which were subjected to the WTO’s dispute settle-
ment system as early as in 1996. We’ll analyze the EU-U.S dispute on 
“beef-hormones” in the following paragraphs. 
 Case 1 (hard governance): the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanisms as 
a means to solve the US-EU ‘beef 
hormones’ trade conflict 
The ‘Beef Hormones case’ between the U.S. and the EU can be traced 
back to the early 1980s (Pollack and Shaffer 2001; Bermann 2007; 
Wilson 2007; Johnson and Hanrahan 2010; Peel 2012). As early as in 
1981 the EC Council of Ministers adopted a directive (81/602) which 
lay down the foundation for a general prohibition against the use of 
hormones except for therapeutic purposes (WTO 1997). The Council of 
Ministers decided to postpone the adoption of concrete measures pend-
ing further investigations. Reports from the EU’s scientific expert 
groups later showed that natural hormones, when applied properly, do 
not represent any great danger to public health. Based on scientific 
advice, the European Commission decided in 1984 to draft changes to 
Directive 81/602 with the intention of allowing the use of natural hor-
mones. The European Parliament went strongly against this and 
demonstrated moreover strong opposition against the use of hormones 
in general. In December 1985 the EU introduced a ban on both natural 
and synthetic hormones and announced that a ban on the imports of 
animals and meat from animals that have been treated with hormones 
would be adopted before 1 January 1988. In 1987 the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission adopted recommendations on the maximum residue 
limits of synthetic hormones in meat production. Codex also stated that 
maximum residue limits for natural hormones were not necessary be-
cause of the small risk to health (WTO 1997). Codex Alimentarius 
Commission10 is an intergovernmental food standards agency estab-
lished by the United Nations (FAO and WHO) in 1963, which in the 
WTO is referred to as one of three bodies that develops international 
standards which are recognized as relevant under the SPS Agreement 
(Veggeland and Borgen 2005). 
The U.S. complained that the EU ban on beef imports based on the 
prohibition against the use of hormones in meat production, in effect 
was a NTB that could not be justified under GATT rules. The U.S. tried 
in the late 1980s to use the dispute settlement mechanism available 
under GATT to force the EU to lift its ban. Central to the conflict were 
six hormones – three synthetic and three natural – which the U.S. al-
                                                          
10  In 2014, Codex Alimentarius Commission had 185 member countries and one 
member organization: the EU. 
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lowed in meat production. In accordance with the GATT dispute set-
tlement procedures, the two trading partners entered into bilateral con-
sultations with the intention of solving the conflict. However, the dis-
cussions broke down and the EU blocked the U.S. attempt at bringing 
the case further in legal proceedings under GATT dispute settlement 
procedures. In contrast to the procedures under the WTO, each member 
in GATT had the option of blocking any attempt at bringing a legal case 
against it under GATT rules (Van den Bossche and Zdouc 2013). In 
1989, the EU finally implemented the import ban for all hormone-
treated meat. This led the U.S. to implement sanctions against the EU at 
a value of approximately $ 100 million. 
In 1995, the WTO Agreement (and thus also the SPS Agreement) en-
tered into force. The WTO also included a new dispute settlement 
mechanism where two elements were particularly important: First, the 
establishment of a permanent Appellate Body, and second, the intro-
duction of the ‘reversed veto’ meaning that each WTO member now had 
the right to bring a case to dispute settlement. The option to block legal 
proceedings was thus effectively removed. In 1995, the Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission again adopted maximum residue limits for two syn-
thetic hormones and confirmed that this was not necessary for natural 
hormones. The Codex decision was based on a vote where the EU coun-
tries voted against.  
In 1996 the U.S. requested consultations with the EU under the new 
dispute settlement procedures of the WTO.11  In anticipation of the out-
come of the WTO legal proceedings, the U.S. had to abolish its punitive 
measures against the EU. The U.S. argued that the EU ban on hormones 
was (WTO 1997)… 
 …not based on an acceptable risk and therefore was in breach 
of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
 …maintained without sufficient scientific evidence and was 
therefore in breach of Article 2.2. 
 …not introduced as temporary measures in accordance with ar-
ticle 5.7. 
 …a breach of Articles 2.2 and 5.6 because it was not based on 
scientific principles, was not introduced with the only intention 
of protecting public health and, moreover, was more trade re-
strictive than necessary to achieve an adequate level of protec-
tion. 
                                                          
11 An overview of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism is included in Annex 
3. 
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 …discriminating on an arbitrary and unlawful manner in rela-
tion to member countries where identical or similar conditions 
exist and moreover constituted a disguised restriction on trade 
– both violations of Article 2.3. 
 …not based on relevant international standards and therefore 
was in breach of Article 3.1. 
 …based on arbitrary and unlawful determination of level of pro-
tection and therefore constituted a discriminatory measure or 
disguised restriction on trade, which violates Article 5. 
 And, that it violated Article 3.3 since the deviation from inter-
national standards was not justified. 
The EU and the U.S. did not come to an agreement during the consulta-
tions and consequently, the U.S. then requested the WTO to establish a 
Panel to consider the case. On 30 June 1997 the Panel report was sub-
mitted to the relevant parties (WTO 1997). The Panel undertook a rela-
tively strict interpretation of the SPS Agreement and ended up by giv-
ing considerable support to the claims of the U.S., including that the EU 
import ban was in conflict with Articles 3.1, 3.3, 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement. The Panel’s main conclusion was that the import ban was 
in conflict with the SPS Agreement and it recommended that the Dis-
pute Settlement Body (consisting of all WTO members) should request 
the EU to bring its measures into conformity with SPS rules. The EU 
appealed many of the Panel’s rulings and the case was therefore 
brought to the WTO Appellate Body, which in January 1998 submitted 
its report (WTO 1998). The Appellate Body upheld most of the Panel's 
findings and conclusions, including the main conclusion that the EU 
measures were in conflict with the EU’s obligations under the SPS 
Agreement and therefore had to be brought into conformity with the 
provisions of the agreement. Thus, neither the Panel nor the Appellate 
Body had found that the EU had provided sufficient evidence to justify 
the import ban on hormone-treated meat. The Appellate Body neverthe-
less either reversed or modified some of the Panel’s finding (WTO 
1998:102-104).  
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s general interpretative rul-
ing that the SPS Agreement necessarily allocates the whole evidentiary 
burden to the Member imposing a SPS measure (WTO 1998: 36-41). It 
stated that the complainant first must provide evidence and legal ar-
guments sufficient to substantiate that the defendant’s measures are 
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement (c.f. provide a prima facie case) 
before “the burden of proof moves” to the defendant to bring forward 
evidence and arguments to disprove the complainant’s claims (WTO 
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1998:41).12 The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel’s conclusion 
that when a measure is not based on an international standard in ac-
cordance with Article 3.1, the burden is automatically on the Member 
imposing the measure to show consistency of the measure with Article 
3.3 (scientific justification). Furthermore, the Appellate Body reversed 
the Panel’s ruling that the term “based on” (c.f. based on international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations), as used in Articles 3.1 
and 3.3 has the same meaning as “conform to”, as used in Article 3.2. 
This may be interpreted as allowing for greater latitude with respect to 
how to comply with international standards. 
The Appellate Body modified the Panel’s interpretation of “risk as-
sessment” by holding that neither Article 5.1 and Article 5.2 nor Annex 
A of the SPS Agreement require a risk assessment to establish a mini-
mum quantifiable magnitude of risk (ibid.). Moreover, these provisions 
do not exclude that a risk assessment may take into account other 
(qualitative) factors. The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel’s find-
ing that the term “based on” as used in Article 5.1 (“based on an as-
sessment (…) taking into account risk assessment techniques devel-
oped by the relevant International Organization”) entails a “minimum 
procedural requirement” that a Member imposing a SPS measure must 
submit evidence that it actually took into account a risk assessment 
when it enacted or maintained the measure. The Appellate Body also 
reversed the Panel’s findings and conclusions on Article 5.5, which 
meant that the Appellate Body did not find that the EU measures had 
resulted in “discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade” (ibid.). The Appellate Body nevertheless upheld the Panel’s rul-
ing that the EU’s import ban was in conflict with the SPS Agreement, 
based primarily on the conclusion that the EU’s measures were incon-
sistent with the requirements of Article 5.1, i.e. that the EU had not 
ensured that its measures were “…based on an assessment, as appro-
priate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life 
or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by 
the relevant international organizations” (WTO 1997, 1998: 104). 
The Appellate Body assessments were perceived as important, since 
they could be perceived as a “softening” in relation to the Panel inter-
pretations of the SPS Agreement, both with regard to the burden of 
proof, deviations from international standards and the requirements 
for risk assessments. EU perceived this as a signal that even if they 
could not demonstrate a quantifiable measurable risk to human health 
from eating hormone-treated meat they could justify the import ban by 
scientifically demonstrating that there are certain risks involved. How-
                                                          
12  The WTO Appellate Body’s use of legal concepts such as “prima facie case” and the 
move or the shift of the “burden of proof” has been much discussed and even criti-
cized for being ambiguous and potentially misleading (Echols 2001: 140-147; Bar-
celó 2009). However, in this paper, we only refer to the actual WTO rulings and do 
not further explore the controversies regarding these legal issues. 
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ever, based on the recommendations and rulings of the Panel and the 
Appellate Body, the EU was requested in 1998 by the Dispute Settle-
ment Body to bring its measures in conformity with the SPS Agreement. 
When the EU failed to comply with this decision by the deadline of 13 
May 1999, the U.S made a request for the approval of retaliatory 
measures on the import of EU produce at the value of $ 202 million. 
The Dispute Settlement Body then authorized on 26 July 1999 penal-
ties at the value of $ 116, 8 million (WTO 1999).13 Among the EU prod-
ucts affected were meat products, Roquefort cheese, chocolate, juices, 
jams and fresh truffles. 
Then, in 2003 the EU informed at a meeting in the Dispute Settle-
ment Body that the EU had adopted a new Directive (2003/74EC) re-
garding the prohibition of the use of certain hormones in stock farming 
and that, because the Directive was based on a new risk assessment 
carried out by an independent scientific committee, there was no long-
er any legal basis for the U.S. to continue to impose retaliatory 
measures (WTO 2015a). The EU thus demanded that the U.S. should lift 
its sanctions. The U.S. rejected the claim that the EU had implemented 
the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body and 
therefore refused to lift its sanctions. The EU then, in 2004, filed a re-
quest for consultation with the U.S. on this matter under the Dispute 
Settlement Procedures based on the claim that the U.S should remove 
its retaliatory measures insofar as the EU had removed the measures 
found inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. On 25 September 2008 the 
EU and the U.S. notified the Dispute Settlement Body that in relation to 
the ongoing dispute, they had agreed on a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU) regarding the importation of beef from animals not 
treated with certain growth-promoting hormones and the increased 
duties applied by the U.S. on certain EU products (ibid.; United States 
Trade Representative 2008). Under the terms of the MoU, the EU ac-
cepted to provide significant access to U.S. produced beef from cattle 
not treated with growth-promoting hormones (first year up to 20.000 
tons at zero duty – with the potential to increase to 45.000 tons in the 
fourth year). The U.S. agreed on its side to delay the imposition of addi-
tional duties on EU produce, which had been scheduled to go into ef-
fect prior to the MoU. Moreover, the U.S. would work on the suspension 
of duties already imposed on produce from the EU. In 2013, it became 
clear that the EU and the U.S. were not able to move to the planned 
Phase 3 of the MoU where the U.S. would remove all trade sanctions. 
However, on 14 April 2014 the EU and the U.S. notified the Dispute 
Settlement Body of a revision made to the MoU on 21 October 2013 
(WTO 2015a). This revision meant that the EU maintains its duty-free 
quotas on U.S. beef until August 2015 at the quantity of 45 000 tons 
while allowing for negotiations of a definite solution to the dispute by 
this date.  
                                                          
13  The United Kingdom was the only EU member state not having any products on the 
U.S. “blacklist” of retaliatory measures (additional duties). 
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Thus, the MoU has just been a temporary arrangement pending a fi-
nal solution to the dispute. Nevertheless, the implementation of the 
MoU clearly had a positive effect on U.S. exports to the EU 28, which is 
shown in Figure 5 below. Figure 5 illustrates that as early as in 1989, 
U.S. beef exports to the EU were very low–due mainly to the EU re-
strictions on the use of hormones in meat production and the de facto 
import ban that followed from these rules. The sharp increase in beef 
exports in the late 2000s illustrates the effect of the dialogue that was 
initiated bilaterally between the EU and the U.S. on allowing trade in 
beef without compromising the EU ban on the use of hormones – end-
ing up with the import quotas as agreed upon in the MoU. Figure 5 also 
shows that U.S. exports of beef to rest of the world sharply declined in 
2004. The decline was caused by an incident of BSE (c.f. Mad Cow De-
cease) in U.S. cattle in 2003, which triggered trade restrictions on beef 
imposed by major importing countries around the world (FAO 2004; 
Almas et al. 2005; Taha and Hahn 2012). Exports to the rest of the 
world regained a few years later (but then under new trade conditions), 
as shown in figure 5.  
 
 
Figure5: U.S. beef exports 1989-2013 (value)  
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau Trade Data). 14 
                                                          
14  Figure 5 is indexed (1989=100) in order to optimize visual presentation of varia-
tions over time. Numbers are originally in 1000 U.S. dollar. 
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Figure6: U.S. beef imports 1989-2013 (value) 
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau Trade Data).15 
 
Figure 6 shows some peculiar developments in beef U.S. imports – 
caused mainly by the outbreaks of BSE in Europe in the mid- to late 
1990s (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005). The BSE crisis seriously 
“hit” the EU in 1996, when a possible connection between BSE and a 
new version of the human disease Creutzfeldt-Jacob decease was pub-
lished, subsequently triggering, in effect, a ban in many countries on 
imports of bovine products from the EU (Vos 2000; ibid.). The U.S. ban 
was in place until January 2015, when the U.S. government decided to 
progressively re-open its market to imports of beef from the EU (Euro-
pean Commission 2015a). Figure 6 also shows that although beef im-
ports from the EU more or less ceased entirely, there was at the same 
time an increase in beef imports from the rest of the world. 
Thus, figures 5 and 6 are good illustrations of the potentially severe 
impact of NTBs on trade. The U.S. has experienced this as a beef im-
porter, when the BSE crisis hit the EU in 1996, and as a beef exporter, 
when the incident of BSE was uncovered in 2004, as well as the 
longstanding EU restrictions on imports of hormone-treated beef. The 
EU has also experienced the trade effects of NTBs as an exporter, 
caused by the BSE crisis, and as an importer, based on the ban on hor-
mones in beef. However, figure 5 also illustrates the significant effect of 
engaging in alternative arrangements to allow for trade. After the MoU 
came into place, beef exports from the U.S. to the EU had an immediate 
sharp increase. This also illustrates the negative effect that the EU pro-
hibition on hormones had on transatlantic trade prior to the MoU. The 
question then is of course whether the quotas for import of beef into the 
EU from the U.S. will continue after August 2015 or if the situation will 
return to the situation prior to the implementation of the MoU.  
                                                          
15  Figure 6 is indexed (1989=100) in order to optimize the visual presentation of vari-
ations over time. Numbers are originally in 1000 U.S. dollar. 
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We see that despite being handled by the powerful WTO dispute set-
tlement mechanism, the ‘beef hormones dispute” between the EU and 
the U.S. has in practice remained without any permanent solution ever 
since the late 1980s. However, as both Parties have chosen to act ac-
cording to WTO rules and not engage in a purely bilateral conflict, the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism may have contributed to avoid a 
further escalation of the conflict, i.e. to cause greater injuries to trade in 
other products than beef (c.f. also that the WTO dispute settlement 
body authorized less strict retaliation measures than initially requested 
from the U.S). The ‘beef hormones case’ also illustrates that although 
the SPS Agreement clearly restricts – legally – the member’s freedom to 
adopt measures that in effect become technical barriers to trade, in 
practice it is difficult to “force” the members to comply with their obli-
gations under the agreement when strong interests and preferences are 
involved. 
 Both the EU and the U.S. seem to have had strong interests in the 
‘beef hormones-case’: the U.S. economically related to the beef exports, 
the EU based on health- and consumer-protection. In this situation, the 
EU has also been accused of using health-protection concerns as a cov-
er for protectionism, thus not really having any real interest in finding a 
solution through conflict-resolution. Notwithstanding the question of 
whether protectionist interests have been involved or not, the history of 
the ‘beef hormones case’ shows that the EU has been concerned with 
searching for and applying science-based arguments to justify the ban. 
It is also important to note that the EU’s ban on hormones in meat pro-
duction has not only affected the U.S., but all meat producers within 
the EU, as well as all meat producers wanting to export to the EU. Thus, 
as the WTO Appellate Body also concluded, the ban cannot be consid-
ered as an arbitrary and discriminatory regulatory measure as such. In 
addition, the U.S. retaliation measures have caused real injuries to EU 
industries thus creating an economic interest in the EU to find a solu-
tion to the dispute. Thus, put together, these factors indicate that the 
EU has in fact been interested in finding ways to solve the dispute, but 
without compromising health-protection concerns. The fact that the 
EU and the U.S. chose to “leave” the WTO dispute settlement track and 
use a “softer” conflict-resolution instrument by engaging in the 
MoU actually indicates a common interest in solving the dispute 
and re-open markets. 
 Case 2 (soft governance): the use 
of an equivalence agreement to fa-
cilitate trade in U.S.-EU food trade 
relations 
After six years of negotiations, the EU and the U.S, finally signed the 
Veterinary Equivalency Agreement (VEA) on July 20, 1999.16 This VEA 
is of particular importance for facilitation of world trade because of the 
extensive trade volume that exists between the two parties. According 
to the European Commission, the EU and the U.S. accounted between 
them for about 37% of world merchandise trade and 45% of world 
trade in services at the time of the signing of the VEA and they were 
(and still are) each other’s single largest  trading partner (European 
Commission 2001: Chapter 1, A5). The VEA covers two-way trade in 
various animal products valued at about $3 billion annually (Becker 
1999). The VEA document includes a list of all the individual products 
that are covered by the agreement, and each of the products is assigned 
a level of equivalency for the respective requirements attached to it. 
The rankings are listed in Table 3 below (USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service 2005: 5; 2010).  
Table 3: Equivalency Rankings: an explanation 
Ranking 
categories 
Implications for trade 
Yes (1) The importing Party agrees that the exporting Party’s measures 
achieve the importing Party’s appropriate level of sanitary pro-
tection. 
Yes (2) The importing Party agrees that the exporting Party’s measures, 
with the special conditions set out, achieve the importing Par-
ty’s appropriate level of sanitary protection.  
Yes (3): Equivalency agreed in principle, subject to satisfactory comple-
tion of the actions. Pending completions, trade shall occur on 
the basis of the special conditions set out. 
NE: Not evaluated (NE). Trade shall occur on the basis of compliance 
with the importing Party’s requirements. 
E Still evaluating. Trade shall occur on the basis of compliance 
with the importing Party’s requirements.  
                                                          
16  The presentation and analysis of the VEA between the EU and the U.S. builds to a 
large extent on Veggeland (2006, paragraph 3.3.2), but the case has been reana-
lyzed, updated and supplemented by findings from the USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service report from 2010 and trade data from U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Yes 1 is the highest degree of equivalency that can be achieved under 
the agreement and implies that trade can occur without impediments 
caused by the requirements evaluated (c.f. full equivalency). The other 
two rankings involving agreed equivalence (Yes 2 and Yes 3) set out 
special conditions for trade to occur. Table 4 lists the total condition of 
equivalency under the VEA as of 2010 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Ser-
vice 2010). 
 
Table 4: Equivalency rankings for traded products under the EU-U.S. VEA as of 
201017 
 Yes 
1 
Yes 
2 
Yes 3 E NE Total 
U.S. regulations/standards 28 
(30) 
36 
(36) 
10 
(11) 
17 
(17) 
31 
(32) 
122 
(126) 
EU regulations/standards 3 
(4) 
8 
(8) 
9 
(10) 
21 
(21) 
82 
(82) 
123 
(125) 
 
First, it is interesting to note that the number of equivalency rankings 
has actually gone down since 2005 – from a total of 251 in 2005 to a 
total of 245 in 2010. Yes 1 and Yes 2 rankings have gone down from 78 
to 75. This illustrates the problems of maintaining equivalency. Equiva-
lency rankings for U.S. regulations/standards give favourable condi-
tions for EU exports to the U.S.; equivalency rankings for EU regula-
tions/standards give favourable conditions for U.S. exports to the EU. 
Table 4 shows that the EU has achieved considerably more of the two 
highest equivalency rankings (Yes 1 and Yes 2) on U.S. regulation/ 
standards than vice-versa. Thus, the U.S. has provided more favourable 
conditions to EU products than the EU has provided for U.S. products 
(see USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2010). However, the number of 
equivalency rankings does not necessarily say anything about the val-
ue or quantity of trade in these products. Thus, more information about 
the relative trade significance of each product is needed in order to 
make a more comprehensive evaluation (Annex 3 shows equivalency 
rankings distributed on products). Furthermore, because of the struc-
ture of the VEA it is difficult to estimate accurately the trade implica-
tions of the agreement’s equivalency rankings. Five years after the VEA 
entered into force, the U.S Department of Agricultures’ (USDA) Foreign 
Agricultural Service nevertheless made some attempts at determining 
the trade impact of the VEA (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005). 
The 2005 report compares data on trade in all the products covered by 
the VEA from the year the agreement went into effect (1999) against 
data on trade in all such products for every year up to and including 
2004 (see Table 5). 
 
                                                          
17  The numbers in parenthesis are equivalency rankings reported in 2005 (USDA For-
eign Agricultural Service 2005). 
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Table 5: Value of trade in all products covered by the VEA between the EU and 
the U.S – 1999 and 2004. 
 U.S. exports to the EU EU exports to the U.S. 
 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Trade value all 
products 
$2,635 billion  $3,039 billion $2,261 billion $3,066 billion 
Trade value Yes 1 
 Products 
$239,251  
thousand 
$391,144  
thousand 
$145,028  
thousand 
$154,892  
thousand 
 
The data shows that in the period 1999–2004 the trade of VEA prod-
ucts from the EU to the U.S. and vice versa increased in value. Thus, the 
value of trade in all such products has increased in the period 1999–
2004 for both parties to the agreement. The data further indicate a clear 
increase in the value of trade in the products with the highest equiva-
lency ranking (YES 1 products). Table 5 shows a clear increase in U.S. 
exports to the EU. This is largely caused by exports of high value Yes 1 
products such as fish. However, when we look at trade volume meas-
ured in quantities, the picture changes somewhat. This is partly caused 
by fluctuations in exchange rates. As for U.S. exports, quantities in-
creased significantly in only a very few categories, namely live animals, 
fish, dairy products and bird eggs, products of animal origin NESOI18, 
and raw hides and bovine skins. The increase in the value of EU exports 
to the U.S. is not reflected by a corresponding increase in the quantity 
of exports. However, there was an increase even in export quantities in 
the categories of meat and edible meat offal, food preparations NESOI, 
and Casein. Thus, for important YES 1 products such as fish products 
from the U.S. and meat and edible meat offal products from the EU, the 
positive effect of the VEA on trade seems to hold, even when exports in 
such products are measured in quantities (ibid). 
The U.S. report on the VEA from 2010 points out, that U.S. exports 
to the EU of products covered by the VEA rose by 44 percent from 1989 
to 1999 and were then worth more than $2 billion in value (USDA For-
eign Agricultural Service 2010). Between 1999 and 2009 U.S. exports 
of VEA products increased by 67 percent, reaching a value of more 
than $3.5 billion (ibid.). The report thus points to the fact that the rate 
of growth for bilateral trade between the U.S. and the EU increased af-
ter the implementation of the VEA in 1999, but remained steady for 
U.S. exports to the world. The report therefore suggests that the VEA 
had affected trade between the U.S. and the EU positively. However, 
the report also comments upon the need for greater equivalency for 
U.S. products under the VEA in order to accelerate the rate of growth in 
U.S. exports (ibid.). The disproportionate distribution of equivalency 
rankings presented in Table 4 indicates that there is a potential under 
the VEA to establish more favorable conditions for transatlantic trade. 
Some of the same trade trends that were presented in the U.S. reports of 
                                                          
18  NESOI = Not Elsewhere Specified Or Indicated. 
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2005 and 2010 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005; 2010) are 
also reflected in figures 7 and 8 below.19  
 
Figure 7: U.S. exports of VEA products 1989-2013 (value)  
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau Trade Data). 
 
Figure 7 shows the development of U.S. exports of VEA products be-
tween 1989 and 2013 to the EU 28 and the world respectively. More or 
less in line with the findings in the 2010 report (USDA Foreign Agricul-
tural Service 2010), we find that U.S. exports of VEA products to the EU 
in the time periods 1989-1999 and 1999-2009 rose by 43% and 68% 
respectively, whereas the similar numbers for U.S. exports to the world 
were 73% and 77%.  
                                                          
19  Figure 6 and 7are indexed (1989=100) in order to optimize visual presentation of 
variations over time.  
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Figure 8: U.S. imports of VEA products 1989-2013 (value)  
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau Trade Data). 
 
Figure 8 shows the developments of U.S. imports of VEA products be-
tween 1989 and 2013. U.S. imports from the EU in the time periods 
1989-1999 and 1999-2009 were 33% and 39% respectively, whereas 
the similar numbers for U.S. imports from the world were 62% and 
51%. Thus, the growth in imports from the rest of the world slowed 
down the first decade after the VEA between the U.S. and the EU went 
into force. Between 2009 and 2013 trade in VEA products continued to 
grow. However, in this period the growth in U.S. exports to the EU is 
weaker (33%) than growth in exports to the rest of the world (60%). 
Still, the growth in imports from the EU (47%) is stronger than from the 
rest of the world (39%). 
Table 6 below summarizes the comparisons between U.S. trade in 
VEA products with the EU and the world respectively. The comparison 
shows that the growth in trade in VEA products between the U.S. and 
the EU has increased after the VEA was put in place in 1999 and that 
this growth has been clearly more prominent in trade relations between 
the EU and the U.S. than in trade relations between the U.S. and the 
rest of the world. This indicates that the VEA, despite all implementa-
tion problems, has created more favorable trade conditions. 
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Table 6: Growth in trade in VEA products (1989 – 2013) 
 
 U.S. exports to the EU - 
growth % 
U.S. exports to the world – 
growth % 
1989-1999 43 73 
1999-2009 68 77 
 U.S. imports from the EU – 
growth % 
U.S. imports from the world 
– growth % 
1989-1999 33 62 
1999-2009 39 51 
 U.S. exports to the EU -growth 
% 
U.S. exports to the world – 
growth % 
2009–2013 33 60 
 U.S. imports from the EU -
growth % 
U.S. imports from the world 
– growth % 
2009-2013 47 39 
 
The value of U.S. exports to the EU of VEA products rose from 2 billion 
U.S. dollars in 1999 to 4.6 billion dollars in 2013; similar numbers for 
U.S. exports to the world were 17.6 billion dollars and 49.1 billion dol-
lars. The value of U.S. imports of VEA products from the EU rose from 
2.2 billion dollars in 1999 to 4.5 billion dollars in 2013; similar num-
bers for U.S. imports from the world were 18.3 billion dollars and 38.6 
billion dollars. After the VEA went into effect in 1999, the growth has 
generally been higher for bilateral trade between EU and the U.S. than 
for U.S. trade with the rest of the world, although this picture is more 
nuanced after 2009. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, the num-
bers show that U.S. exports to the EU had a higher growth than vice-
versa for the years studied. However, this may be explained by the 
massive trade restrictions on EU food imports that were put in place by 
the U.S. when the BSE crisis hit Europe in the 1990s.  
Figures 7 and 8 and Table 6 only provide a general picture of the 
trade flows, but nevertheless seem to indicate some positive effects of 
the VEA on transatlantic trade. Even though these effects do not appear 
as very strong, there are indications of positive effects both at the ag-
gregate level and when we look at specific products (as indicated 
above). However, according to officials of both the European Commis-
sion and the U.S., handling the VEA has not been an easy endeavour.20 
First, the negotiations were difficult and time-consuming, lasting more 
than six years. Second, the parties did not succeed in solving disa-
greements on one of the most important traded products between the 
parties, namely poultry. Strong disagreement over hygiene require-
ments for poultry production continued, despite poultry being covered 
by the VEA. The core of the disagreement is that the U.S. allows for 
                                                          
20  Interviews conducted with officials of the European Commission’s DG SANCO and 
the U.S. Mission to the European Union, Brussels, October 2005 (Veggeland 2006). 
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poultry being processed with certain pathogen reduction treatments 
(PRTs) – such as chlorine dioxide – to ensure food safety, but the EU 
does not. The VEA was originally supposed to solve the problem by 
including poultry as a product category destined for equivalence, but 
the EU has continued all up until 2015 to prohibit the use of PRTs and 
thus the importation of poultry from the U.S. treated with these sub-
stances (Johnson 2015). Poultry actually has a Yes 1 equivalency for 
animal health and Yes 3 equivalency for human health under the VEA 
(USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2010). Still, trade in poultry be-
tween the EU and the U.S. has declined in the period 2005-2009 (ibid.). 
One factor affecting trade in poultry negatively is of course the above-
mentioned disagreement on PRTs in poultry production. This disa-
greement actually led the U.S. to file a WTO complaint against the EU in 
January 2009 (Johnson 2015). A WTO Panel was established in No-
vember 2009, but the case has been put on hold pending further con-
sultations between the parties, including discussions taking place with-
in the framework of the ongoing TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership) negotiations between the EU and the U.S. The U.S. 
poultry industry has indicated that it is unlikely to support a TTIP 
agreement if it does not provide better access for U.S. poultry products 
to the EU market (Johnson 2015:6). 
Third, it has proved difficult to perform new equivalency determina-
tions (between 1999 and 2006 determination of equivalency was per-
formed for only two new product categories), as well as to uphold es-
tablished equivalency determinations over time. These problems are 
among other things due to changes in circumstances and the fact that 
national requirements continuously are updated. One example of prob-
lems in upholding equivalency over time is trade in seafood under the 
VEA (United States Trade Representative 2014: 49). Prior to 2008, the 
EU authorized imports of U.S.‐origin molluscan shellfish based on 
equivalence assessments under the terms stated in the VEA. In 2008, 
the European Commission’s DG SANCO notified the U.S. that the import 
approval (and thus the equivalence determination) for U.S.‐origin mol-
luscan shellfish would expire at the end of 2009. Thus, the EU began 
barring imports of all U.S.‐origin molluscan shellfish other than scal-
lops in July 2010 – despite protests coming from the U.S. government. 
These developments led the U.S. government to engage actively with 
the European Commission with the aim of providing the information 
the EU demanded in order regain an equivalence determination and 
thus to allow imports of U.S. molluscan shellfish to resume. As of early 
2014, the case was not yet solved (ibid). Another example of the prob-
lems of upholding equivalence determinations is EU.-U.S trade in 
wheat (United States Trade Representative 2014: 50). Many EU coun-
tries test U.S. shipments of wheat for Karnal Bunt (KB=a fungal disease) 
spores. The U.S. has pointed out that there has never been a confirmed 
case of KB contamination of a U.S. wheat shipment in the 20 years that 
have gone since KB was first found in the U.S. (ibid.). Moreover, the 
U.S. claims that these tests can produce false positives, resulting in lost 
Frode Veggeland and Stine Evensen Sørbye 
 
32 
shipments and thus lead to unjustified restrictions to trade. The U.S. 
also points out that the EU has refused to accept certain official sam-
pling and testing requirements of the USDA’s Federal Grain Inspection 
Service (FGIS) in shipments of U.S. wheat for export as equivalent to 
the EU testing methods. Thus, the USDA is working with technical ex-
perts in the European Commission with the aim of ensuring EU recogni-
tion of the sampling and testing methods as equivalent (ibid.). 
Fourth, differences in how the sanitary and phytosanitary area is be-
ing organized in the EU and the U.S. have also caused some problems 
regarding the administration of the equivalency agreement. This last 
point illustrates that the effectiveness of a “soft” trade-facilitating tool 
such as equivalence is enhanced when there is compatibility between 
regulatory systems involved – and vice-versa, determining equivalence 
is harder the more different the systems are. Both EU and U.S. officials 
have stressed that degree of system compatibility is important with 
regard to how and whether the equivalency agreement works. This af-
fects negotiation processes, as well as the operation of equivalency 
agreements.  
In the EU all VEAs are administered by the European Commission’s 
DG SANCO. This is in accordance with the implementation of major 
reforms in EU’s food regulation whereby responsibilities for food safety 
policies have ended up as the responsibility of DG SANCO (Ugland and 
Veggeland 2006). Hence, because the primary responsibility for the 
sanitary and phytosanitary area and VEAs is placed in DG SANCO, the 
other parties to the EU’s VEAs (the countries themselves) only have to 
relate to one single authority regarding the follow-up of the agreements 
(USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005: 4). With regard to monitor-
ing the sanitary equivalency of a product traded between the EU and 
the U.S., there is a delineation of responsibility according to whether 
the product is being imported or exported (ibid.). The primary respon-
sibilities for EU exports to the U.S. lie with the individual member state 
involved in the exportation. These responsibilities include the control 
of production requirements and the issuing of health certificates. EU 
Member States must either conform to the standards of the importing 
country, or alternatively base the exports on possibly agreed equiva-
lency determinations with this country. The Member States have also 
retained important tasks and responsibilities with regard to imports, 
but in this area they are primarily charged with complying with EU 
regulations. The EU has a comprehensive set of harmonized legislation 
which regulates imports of food and veterinary products from third 
countries and is enforced through customs and border inspections 
(ibid; Ugland and Veggeland 2004). Thus, in this area national cus-
toms and food inspection authorities act as agents of the European 
Commission, which is the supreme authority for regulating imports into 
the Single European Market (Ugland and Veggeland 2006). 
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The fragmented structure of the U.S. regulatory systems stands out 
in contrast to the EU’s single authority structure (USDA Foreign Agri-
cultural Service 2005: 4; United States Trade Representative 2014). 
Depending on the product being traded, responsibilities for domestical-
ly produced as well as imported veterinary products, encompasses a 
large number of agencies: U.S. Trade Representative (USTR),  U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(OCPP), U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Department of 
Commerce (DOC), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)21, Federal Grain Inspection 
Service (FGIS), Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), and U.S. Depart-
ment of State (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2005; United States 
Trade Representative 2014). Thus, there are some significant differ-
ences between the EU and U.S. regulatory systems. EU’s system is basi-
cally characterized by a demarcation of responsibilities along the lines 
of imported vs. exported products as well as by a horizontally integrat-
ed food safety system where primary responsibility for safety regulation 
of food imports and for consumer and health protection is placed with-
in a single agency, DG SANCO. Furthermore, in line with this structure 
there is a clear separation of, on the one side, the quality, technical and 
commercial aspects of food regulation and, on the other side, the 
health and consumer protection aspects. The U.S. system is more frag-
mented and characterized by a number of different agencies with juris-
diction over different products and processes. Thus, demarcation of 
responsibilities in the U.S. runs along the lines of the products being 
traded. This has created a mismatch between the EU and U.S. systems, 
which sometimes has caused communication problems as well as prob-
lems of maintaining trust and confidence in each other’s systems.22 
The VEA between the EU and the U.S. is an example of the use of an 
alternative ‘route’ of solving conflicts on NTBs, which exists under the 
SPS Agreement. Equivalence assessments allow for trade to continue 
while at the same time keeping (different) domestic regulations in 
place. However, to agree on and maintain equivalence of specific regu-
lations is challenging as it demands extensive information-exchange, 
regulatory dialogue and other confidence- and trust-building activities 
between regulatory authorities. These “soft governance” mechanisms, 
which are part of equivalence agreements, may be effective means of 
avoiding conflicts on NTBs. However, equivalence agreements are re-
source demanding, both to achieve and maintain, and thus seem to 
only have limited effect on trade. Moreover, under poor implementa-
tion “soft governance” may also “harden”, i.e. escalate into formalized 
legal disputes. The case of trade in poultry between the EU and U.S. 
mentioned above is an example of this. The fact that voluntary Codex 
                                                          
21  NOAA was formerly known as National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 
22  Based on interviews with EU and U.S. officials 2005 (Veggeland 2006). 
Frode Veggeland and Stine Evensen Sørbye 
 
34 
standards can be used to fulfill the obligations under the WTO’s SPS 
Agreement and in that way has achieved a “semi-binding” status is 
another example (Veggeland and Borgen 2005). On the other side, 
“hard governance” may also soften, which the “beef hormones” case is 
an example of. In this ongoing dispute the EU-U.S. chose after many 
years to shift from the use of WTO dispute settlement procedures to 
entering into a dialogue and negotiations on a MoU. 
The experiences of the EU and U.S. trade relations confirm the con-
straints, under which equivalence agreements can work. However, 
equivalence can be an effective tool when regulatory differences and 
positions are locked and there are gains to be made by entering into 
long-term cooperation and dialogue in order to move regulatory sys-
tems and understanding closer (see also Table 6 below). For example, 
the fact that technical regulations, including SPS measures, are part of 
the ongoing TTIP negotiations between the EU and the U.S. may indi-
cate that transatlantic regulatory dialogues, which have been going on 
since the 1990s, have created a more advantageous ‘climate’ for regu-
latory cooperation. In this way, “soft governance” may have prepared 
the way for including regulatory measures in bargaining processes and 
hard law agreements and thus for a faster (and easier) move towards 
regulatory convergence. It is moreover interesting to note that even 
though the TTIP negotiations aim at establishing a (hard law) trade 
agreement, the EU proposals for a legal text in the TTIP chapter on reg-
ulatory cooperation predominantly refer to soft governance mecha-
nisms such as consultations, bilateral cooperation mechanisms, infor-
mation and regulatory exchanges, and mutual recognition of equiva-
lence (Moyens 2015; European Union 2015b).  
Moreover, the EU proposal on a SPS chapter in TTIP, published on 
January 7 in 2015, illustrates the emphasis being put on soft govern-
ance mechanisms to facilitate trade (European Union 2015a).23  In this 
proposal, the EU stresses that the EU and the U.S. should respect each 
other’s regulatory systems as well as risk assessment, risk management 
and policy development processes (ibid.). The proposal does not sug-
gest comprehensive harmonization efforts, but instead refers to soft 
governance tools such as improved communication, cooperation, 
transparency, information exchange, technical consultations and, of 
course, equivalence as means to facilitate trade. The proposal includes 
a separate provision on equivalence, which to a large degree is based 
on the principles laid down by the WTO’s SPS Agreement. The EU pro-
poses to set up a separate joint management committee for SPS 
measures, which will, among other things, monitor the implementation 
of the SPS chapter of the TTIP Agreement and examine any matters that 
arise, to provide direction for conflict resolution, to provide a regular 
forum for exchanging information relating to the Parties’ regulatory 
systems, including the scientific basis, to prepare and maintain a doc-
                                                          
23  The full text of the EU proposal is enclosed in Annex 5. 
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ument on detailing state of discussions on the work on equivalence 
recognition, and to “facilitate improved understanding between Parties 
related to the implementation of the SPS Agreement” (ibid.). It is also 
interesting to note that the EU proposal recognizes the achievements 
that have been accomplished under the EU-U.S. VEA and confirms the 
intention to continue this work under the framework of TTIP – the SPS 
chapter in TTIP is supposed to replace the VEA. 
Thus, the TTIP negotiations on SPS issues do not appear to include 
new ambitious and comprehensive attempts at harmonizing or con-
verging, the EU and U.S. regulatory systems. Instead, the TTIP negotia-
tions on SPS issues seem to focus on “softer” means of facilitating 
trade. It seems reasonable to relate this focus to the EU-U.S. experience 
from (and attempts at) solving regulatory disagreements and disputes – 
experiences, which include tough conflicts such as the beef hormones 
dispute analyzed in this paper, as well as the regulatory cooperation 
and dialogue that has been taking place within the VEA framework 
since 1999. 
 Dispute settlement and equiva-
lence: analyzing the effectiveness 
of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ governance in 
conflict-resolution 
In practise, both hard law/governance and soft law/governance is used 
in international trade relations (Shelton 2000; Pollack and Shaffer 
2001, 2010, 2012). Moreover, because of the general lack of powerful 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms, the actual difference be-
tween hard law/governance and soft law/governance is not that evi-
dent as the ideal types would imply. Nevertheless, there are some evi-
dent implications of choosing either a hard governance tool or a soft 
governance tool, which is illustrated in this study by the analyses of the 
use of dispute settlement and equivalence. Enacting dispute settlement 
procedures means that logics of diplomacy and intergovernmentalism 
prevail, that disagreements become formalized and judicialized, and 
that the threat of authorized punishments and sanctions is introduced. 
Conflict resolution is to a large degree taken care of by politicians, law-
yers, diplomats and high level officials. Thus, when preferences and 
interests are strong, the use of dispute settlement may simply “cement” 
and “lock” conflicts. SPS measures are about life and health protection, 
i.e. basic and essential concerns. Thus, the use of dispute settlement in 
this area may be expected to have a high probability of ending up in 
locked situations. This is basically what happened in the “beef hor-
mones” dispute between the EU and the U.S – a conflict that in practise 
has lasted since the end of the 1980s and where the use of dispute set-
tlement procedures did not bring forward a quick solution. Entering 
into processes of mutual equivalence assessments means that logics of 
transnational regulatory governance and transgovernmentalism 
(Slaughter 2004: 36-64) prevail, that disagreements are handled with-
in informal dialogues, and that threats, punishment and sanctions are 
not considered as an appropriate part of the discourse. Conflict resolu-
tion (and thus diplomacy) is to a larger extent taken care of by regula-
tors, scientists and low-level officials (ibid.). The threat of punishment 
is not put up close and the risk of locking situations is therefore lower. 
However, the experience from the VEA between the EU and the U.S. 
shows that equivalence agreements are no quick fix solutions. They 
may be necessary to create common understanding, confidence, faith, 
and trust between regulators and scientists, as well as politicians, on 
both sides, but are not necessarily sufficient to facilitate trade. 
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Thus, there are clear limitations with regard to applying dispute set-
tlement as well as equivalence as trade facilitating tools. Dispute set-
tlement may not be an effective (nor desirable) instrument to use when 
the involved parties have strong beliefs in the necessity of maintaining 
their domestic (trade restrictive) measures based on legitimate health 
concerns. Dispute settlement is simply not an effective instrument to 
solve conflicts on trade-restrictive SPS measures when disparities be-
tween different states’ SPS regulations are based on fundamental dif-
ferences in scientific opinions and regulatory culture. The effectiveness 
of dispute settlement is thus conditioned by the nature of interests and 
preferences (“how unitary and strong?”), as well as by the nature of the 
regulatory concerns (“how fundamental and essential”?). A reasonable 
assumption is that when preferences are strong and fundamental con-
cerns such as health protection are at stake, the threshold for succeed-
ing in solving conflicts through dispute settlement is high. In such situ-
ations, “soft governance” can appear as the only alternative way to 
“move” a locked conflict further. 
As illustrated in this paper, one way of applying “soft governance” 
is to enter into negotiations on equivalence agreements. To determine 
equivalence of individual regulations is one way of moving towards 
regulatory convergence and thus of solving the problem of NTBs. How-
ever, equivalence agreements may be costly to negotiate and maintain. 
Also, they normally necessitate some prior harmonization before 
equivalence assessments can take place. Thus, negotiations of VEAs 
are normally initiated with partners that have a comparable level of 
development; and even then, the agreements may be very difficult to 
implement in practise. Another aspect is that it has proven difficult to 
measure precisely the trade benefits derived from VEAs. In fact, com-
ments made by officials of both the EU and the U.S. indicate that the 
costs are sometimes perceived to exceed the benefits (Veggeland 
2006). In practise it has proven difficult to perform new equivalence 
assessments within established equivalence agreements, which is part-
ly why the European Commission often chooses to refer to them as 
“veterinary agreements” instead of “equivalence agreements”. Moreo-
ver, to negotiate and maintain VEAs demand that the involved coun-
tries have relatively advanced levels of infrastructure and administra-
tive and regulatory capacity. Thus, the EU’s VEAs have been negotiated 
with either advanced developed countries (such as United States, Can-
ada and Australia) or advanced developing countries (such as Chile, 
Mercosur). 
The basic objective of equivalence agreements is of course to facili-
tate trade. The VEA between the EU and the U.S. is an example of an 
agreement with big trade-facilitation potential due to the large amount 
of trade involved. Thus, returns from establishing equivalence agree-
ments may of course be of an economic nature – based on increase in 
trade. However, they may also be of a political nature – for example 
through preparing trading partners for negotiations on a more binding 
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and comprehensive trade agreement, such as the on-going negotiations 
on TTIP, which actually include the SPS area, i.e. NTBs in food trade. 
Thus, trade relations and interdependencies, but also political rela-
tions, matter with regard to the choice of governance instruments to 
facilitate trade. EU officials have stated that equivalence agreements 
may actually be motivated more by political will and political salience 
than economic gains (Veggeland 2006). Both political and economic 
gains may therefore motivate negotiations on equivalence agreements 
– based on the prospect of establishing closer economic relationships 
with a preferred country and on the desire to establish closer regulatory 
co-operation and dialogue more specifically. Political returns from es-
tablishing formal relationships with trading partners through regulato-
ry dialogue and cooperation could thus be an extra incentive, and 
sometimes a prerequisite, for entering into negotiations on binding 
trade agreements (see also above). On the other side, close political 
relationship and strong interdependencies may actually work as a bar-
rier against applying “hard” means to facilitate trade, such as dispute 
settlement. For example, for Norway (not a member of the EU), the 
threshold against filing WTO complaints against EU’s trade-restrictive 
measures seem to have been high for many years, due to their close 
economic and political relationship. Thus, political salience and politi-
cal will matters with regard to decisions on governance instruments 
used in trade-facilitation and conflict-resolution. 
Another important factor, which is relevant for how to approach 
conflicts on NTBs, is level of development, i.e. the infrastructure and 
regulatory capacity of the parties involved. The fact that the EU and the 
U.S. both have an advanced and sophisticated infrastructure in place, 
as well as solid regulatory capacity, allow them to choose between a 
broad spectre of trade facilitation tools in their trade relations. A high 
level of infrastructure and regulatory capacity is of utmost importance 
because many cooperative arrangements – such as equivalency agree-
ments – demand mutual trust and confidence between regulatory sys-
tems. The involved parties need to verify and be assured that other reg-
ulatory systems can “deliver” on health protection.  
The design of political institutions and regulatory frameworks is also 
relevant for how equivalence agreements work (Veggeland 2006). For 
example, the European Commission has experienced problems in its 
regulatory cooperation with the U.S. government because it has had to 
deal with a large number of U.S. agencies, each of which has an inde-
pendent responsibility for a specific regulatory area. Each agency may 
furthermore have its own regulatory culture and views on the best way 
to regulate. The U.S. for its part has only to deal with the European 
Commission, but has nevertheless experienced problems because of 
the complicated political decision-making system in the EU. For exam-
ple, when changes or amendments to agreements are needed, this de-
mands a formal decision by the Council of the European Union and the 
European Parliament. Thus, organizational asymmetry and divergent 
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regulatory cultures may cause problems in negotiating and maintain-
ing trade agreements.  
The effectiveness of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ governance as tools to ensure 
trade facilitation and conflict-resolution is thus conditioned by the 
countries and measures and concerns involved, and by the nature of 
the interests and preferences of these countries.  
Table 7: The assumed effectiveness of hard and soft governance in conflict-
resolution 
  
  Strength of state preferences 
  Strong Weak 
Regulatory 
concerns 
Primary (e.g. health) Soft governance 
effective 
Either 
 Secondary (e.g. quality) Either Hard gover-
nance effective 
 
Table 7 highlights the most favourable conditions under which either 
soft or hard governance is assumed to be effective in solving conflicts 
and facilitating trade. As can be deducted from the governance per-
spectives presented earlier, soft governance tools may be of particular 
relevance in situations where preferences are strong and fundamental 
interests are at stake. Empirically, we find many cases illustrating that 
soft governance mechanisms are being used when core national inter-
ests and fundamental concerns are involved – such as the EU’s use of 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) for collective learning in social 
and health policy, as well as the EU’s use of networks of deliberative 
forums in foreign policy coordination (Trubek and Trubek 2005: 343; 
Smith 2004:105). The ‘beef hormones case’ analysed in this paper il-
lustrates that the availability of a strong and powerful dispute settle-
ment mechanism (c.f. the WTO dispute settlement mechanism) is not 
enough to solve a conflict based on a clear divergence in preferences 
and concerns. Dispute settlement may thus be more effective in situa-
tions where preferences are relatively weak and less fundamental con-
cerns are at stake. Soft governance tools however, may be more effec-
tive precisely in situations where the use of force to ensure compliance 
and conflict-resolution fails. The use of equivalence and MoU in the EU-
U.S. regulatory cooperation is a good example of soft governance tools 
being used in the “shadow of hard conflicts”. Thus, in practise, both 
hard and soft governance are relevant in trade relations and policy-
coordination and may be used interchangeably and/or supplementary 
to get out of ‘locked’ situations in cases of conflict. This is again illus-
trated by conflicts and disputes in the EU-U.S. trade relationships. 
These have been characterized by a combination of ‘hard governance’ 
through the filing of cases under the WTO’s dispute settlement proce-
dures and the implementation of extensive retaliatory measures, and 
an established transatlantic partnership involving “soft governance 
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instruments” through regulatory dialogues, scientific meetings, and 
confidence-building arrangements such as the VEA and the MoU. 
The two case-studies presented in this paper illustrate that there is 
no “walk-in-the-park” as to being assured that the choice of govern-
ance instrument used to solve a conflict on NTBs will achieve the in-
tended effect in an effective way. In order to consider the possible effec-
tiveness of hard and soft governance in conflict resolution on NTBs, it 
is necessary to analyse the preceding history of the conflicts, the condi-
tions under which the conflicts arise, and to make an assessment of 
how fundamental the regulatory differences in practise are. 
 Concluding remarks 
This paper has highlighted two different tools to solve conflicts on 
NTBs and thus to facilitate trade. Dispute settlement and equivalence 
agreements both have strengths and weaknesses in conflict resolution. 
WTO is said to have the strongest dispute settlement and compliance 
mechanisms of all international organizations. Still, in many cases – 
such as the “beef hormones” dispute – this is not necessarily enough to 
solve conflicts and ensure compliance with WTO rules. When funda-
mental concerns (including scientific opinions) are at stake and prefer-
ences are strong, the effectiveness of dispute settlement may be re-
duced. Establishing equivalence assessments can be a “softer” way of 
solving conflicts and facilitating trade while at the same time safe-
guarding fundamental concerns. However, such agreements may be 
resource-demanding to negotiate and remain and their success is 
moreover dependent on factors such as level of trade and development, 
types of regulatory frameworks, and degree of political salience and 
will. There are thus possibilities as well as constraints linked to both 
dispute settlement and equivalence. This study has revealed some of 
the relevant conditions that are important in order to achieve effective 
conflict-resolution through the use of these soft and hard governance 
instruments. However, there is need for more research on the variety of 
instruments that can be used to solve trade conflicts and facilitate trade 
while at the same time being able to safeguard legitimate concern such 
as health protection. Research on the available “toolbox of instru-
ments” (c.f. WTO 2002b) should also shed light on the multi-level as-
pects of regulation: what are the consequences for regulatory govern-
ance of the shifting of regulatory authority from the national to the in-
ternational level? 
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 Annex 1: Provisions on Equivalence and Dispute settlement 
in the SPS Agreement 
 
Article 4  
Equivalence  
1.  Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of oth-
er Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their 
own or from those used by other Members trading in the same prod-
uct, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the import-
ing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member's ap-
propriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. For this pur-
pose, reasonable access shall be given, upon request, to the import-
ing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures. 
2. Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim 
of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition of 
the equivalence of specified sanitary or phytosanitary measures. 
Article 11  
Consultations and Dispute Settlement  
1.  The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborat-
ed and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply 
to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agree-
ment, except as otherwise specifically provided herein. 
2.  In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical 
issues, a panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel 
in consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the panel 
may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an advisory technical 
experts group, or consult the relevant international organizations, at 
the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative. 
3.  Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under 
other international agreements, including the right to resort to the 
good offices or dispute settlement mechanisms of other internation-
al organizations or established under any international agreement.
 Annex 2: The EU and the U.S. as complainants and re-
spondents in WTO disputes under the SPS Agreement – sta-
tus: 20.10.201424 
 
Dispute  Complainant Respon-
dent 
SPS Subject Status 
DS 100 European 
Communities 
Unites 
States 
Art. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 Measures affect-
ing imports of 
poultry products 
In consultation on 18 
August 1997 
DS 279 European 
Communities 
India Art. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 Import re-
strictions main-
tained under the 
export and im-
port policy 
2002-2007 
In consultations on 23 
December 2002 
DS 96 European 
Communities 
India Art. 2, 3, 5 Quantitative 
restrictions on 
imports of agri-
cultural, textile 
and industrial 
products 
Settled or terminated 
(withdraw, mutually 
agreed solution), 7 
April 1998 
DS 287 European 
Communities 
Australia Art. 2.2, 2.3, 3.3, 
4.1, 5.1, 5.6, 5.7, 8, 
Annex C 
Quarantine 
regime for im-
ports 
Settled or terminated 
(withdraw, mutually 
agreed solution), 9 
March 2007 
DS 475 European 
Union 
Russian, 
Federation 
Art. 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 
3.2, 3.3, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 
5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 
6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7,8, 
Annex B, Annex C 
Measures on the 
importation of 
Live Pigs, Pork 
and other Pig 
Products from 
the European 
Union 
 
Panel established, but 
not yet composed, 22 
July 2014 
DS 293 Argentina European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 2.2, 2.3, 5, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 7, 
8, 10, 10.1, Annex 
B, Annex C 
Measures affect-
ing the approval 
and marketing 
of Biotech prod-
ucts 
Settled or terminated 
(withdraw, mutually 
agreed solution), 19 
March 2010 
DS 389 United States European 
Communi-
Art. 2.2, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 
7, 8, Annex B, Annex 
EC – poultry 
(US) 
Panel established, but 
not yet composed, 19 
                                                          
24  Source (viewed December 2014): 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm?year=any
&subject=none&agreement=A19&member1=*&member2=none&complainant1=tr
ue&complainant2=true&respondent1=true&respondent2=true&thirdparty1=true&
thirdparty2=false#results 
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ties C November 2009 
DS 26 United States European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 3, 5 Measuring con-
cerning Meat 
and meat prod-
ucts (hormones) 
Mutually acceptable 
solution on implemen-
tation notified on 25 
September 2009 
DS 291 United States European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 2.2, 2.3, 5, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 7, 
8, Annex B, Annex C 
Measures affect-
ing the approval 
and marketing 
of biotech prod-
ucts 
Authorization to retali-
ate requested (includ-
ing 22.6 arbitration) 
on January 2008 
DS 292 Canada European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 2.2, 2.3, 5, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 7, 
8, Annex B, Annex C 
EC – Approval 
and marketing 
of biotech Prod-
ucts 
Settled or terminated 
(withdraw, mutually 
agreed solution), 15 
July 2009 
DS 48 Canada European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 3, 5 Measuring con-
cerning Meat 
and meat prod-
ucts (hormones) 
Mutually acceptable 
solution on implemen-
tation notified on 17 
March 2011 
DS 135 Canada European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 3, 5 Measures affect-
ing asbestos 
and products 
containing as-
bestos 
Report(s) adopted, no 
further action re-
quired, 5 April 2001 
DS 137 Canada European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Measures affect-
ing imports of 
wood of conifers 
from Canada 
In consultations on 17 
June 1998 
DS 134 India European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2 Restrictions on 
certain import 
duties on rice 
In consultations on 27 
May 1998 
DS 389 United States European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2.2, 5, 5.1, 5.2, 
7, 8, Annex B, Annex 
C 
EC – poultry 
(US) 
Panel established, but 
not yet composed, 19 
November 2009 
DS 26 United States European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 3, 5 Measuring con-
cerning Meat 
and meat prod-
ucts (hormones) 
Mutually acceptable 
solution on implemen-
tation notified on 25 
September 2009 
DS 291 United States European 
Communi-
ties 
Art. 2, 2.2, 2.3, 5, 
5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 7, 
8, Annex B, Annex C 
Measures affect-
ing the approval 
and marketing 
of biotech prod-
ucts 
Authorization to retali-
ate requested (includ-
ing 22.6 arbitration) 
on January 2008 
DS 3 United States Republic of 
Korea 
Art. 2, 5 Measures Con-
cerning the 
Testing and 
Inspection of 
Agricultural 
Products 
In consultations on 
4 April 1995 
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DS 5 United States Republic of 
Korea 
Art. 2, 5 Measures Con-
cerning the 
Shelf-Life of 
Products Com-
plainant: 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) on 
20 July 1995 
DS 21 United States Australia Art. 2,5 7, 8 Measures Af-
fecting the Im-
portation of 
Salmonids 
Settled or terminated 
(withdrawn, mutually 
agreed solution) on 
27 October 2000 
DS 41 United States Republic of 
Korea 
Art. 2, 5, 8 Measures con-
cerning Inspec-
tion of Agricul-
tural Products 
In consultations on 
24 May 1996 
DS 76 United States Japan Art. 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 Measures Af-
fecting Agricul-
tural Products 
Mutually acceptable 
solution on implemen-
tation notified on 
25 September 2001 
DS 203 United States Mexico Art. 2,2,, 2,3, 3, 5.1, 
5.6, 7, 8 
Measures Af-
fecting Trade in 
Live Swine 
In consultations on 
10 July 2000 
DS 245 United States Japan Art. 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 
5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 
6.1, 6.2, 7, Annex B 
Measures Af-
fecting the Im-
portation of 
Apples 
Mutually acceptable 
solution on implemen-
tation notified on 
30 August 2005 
DS 430 United States India Art. 2, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 
5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 
5.7, 6, 6.1, 6.2, 7, 
Annex B 
Measures Con-
cerning the 
Importation of 
Certain Agricul-
tural Products 
Panel report under 
appeal on 
26 January 2015 
DS 144 Canada Unites 
States 
Art. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13, 
Annex B, Annex C 
Certain 
Measures Af-
fecting the Im-
port of Cattle, 
Swine and Grain 
from Canada 
In consultations on 
25 September 1998 
DS 384 Canada Unites 
States 
Art. 2,5, 7 Certain Country 
of Origin Label-
ling (Cool) Re-
quirements 
Compliance proceed-
ings ongoing on 
25 September 2013 
DS 100 European 
Communities 
Unites 
States 
Art. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 Measures affect-
ing imports of 
poultry products 
In consultation on 18 
August 1997 
DS 386 Mexico Unites 
States 
Art. 2, 5, 7 Certain Country 
of Origin Label-
ling Require-
ments 
Compliance proceed-
ings ongoing on 
25 September 2013 
DS 392 China Unites 
States 
Art. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 
3.1, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, 
5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 
Certain 
Measures Af-
fecting Imports 
Report(s) adopted, no 
further action required 
on 25 October 2010 
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5.7, 8 of Poultry from 
China 
DS 406 Indonesia Unites 
States 
Art. 2, 3, 5, 7 Measures Af-
fecting the Pro-
duction and 
Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes 
Mutually acceptable 
solution on implemen-
tation notified on 
3 October 2014 
DS 447 Argentina Unites 
States 
Art. 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 
3.1, 3.3, 5.1, 5.4, 
5.6, 6.1, 6.2, 8, 
10.1, Annex 1c 
Measures Af-
fecting the Im-
portation of 
Animals, Meat 
and Other Ani-
mal Products 
Panel composed on 
8 August 2013 
DS 448  Argentina Unites 
States 
Art. 1.1, 2.2, 2.3, 
3.1, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, 
5.4, 5.6, 7, Annex B, 
8, Annex C, 10.1 
Measures Af-
fecting the Im-
portation of 
Fresh Lemons 
In consultations on 
3 September 2012 
 Annex 3: The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
 
 Annex 4: Conditions of Parity in the VEA between the EU 
and the U.S – as of 201025 
 
 
 
                                                          
25  See USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2010). 
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 Annex 5: EU-US TTIP Negotiations. TEXTUAL PROPOSAL - 
SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES (SPS)26 
 
This TEXTUAL PROPOSAL is the European Union's initial proposal for legal text on" 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)" in TTIP. It was tabled for discussion with 
the US in the negotiating round of (29 September-3 October 2014) and made public on 
7 January 2015. The actual text in the final agreement will be a result of negotiations 
between the EU and US.  
Article 1  
Scope and coverage  
This Chapter applies to all SPS measures that may, directly or indirectly, affect trade 
between the Parties.  
This Chapter shall also apply to collaboration on animal welfare matters.  
 
Article 2  
Objectives. The objectives of this chapter are to:  
1. Facilitate trade between the Parties to the greatest extent possible while preserving 
each Party’s right to protect human, animal or plant life and health in its territory and 
respecting each Party’s regulatory systems, risk assessment, risk management and 
policy development processes;  
2. Ensure that the Parties’ sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures do not create 
unnecessary barriers to trade;  
3. Further the implementation of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO SPS Agreement);  
4. Build upon and extend the scope of the Veterinary Agreement which is fully inte-
grated in this Chapter;  
5. Improve communication and cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
between the Parties;  
6. Improve consistency, predictability and transparency of each Party's SPS measures;  
                                                          
26  Downloaded from the website of the European Commission’s DG Trade, March 10, 
2015: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153026.pdf  
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7. Provide a framework for dialogue and cooperation with a view to enhancing the 
protection and welfare of animals and reaching a common understanding concerning 
animal welfare standards.  
Article 3  
Rights and obligations 
Nothing in this Chapter shall limit the rights or obligations of the Parties under the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation and its Annexes. The Parties 
shall avail themselves of the necessary resources to effectively implement this Chapter.  
Article 4  
Definitions  
For the purpose of this Chapter, “Protected Zone” for a specified regulated organism of 
phytosanitary concern means an officially defined geographical area in the EU in which 
that organism is not established as demonstrated by annual surveys, in spite of favour-
able conditions and its presence in other parts of the Union; The “SPS Agreement” 
means the World Trade Organisation Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. The definitions in Annex A of the SPS Agreement apply, as 
well as those of Codex Alimentarius (Codex), the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). In the event of an in-
consistency between the definitions adopted by Codex, or the OIE, the IPPC and the 
definitions set out in the WTO SPS Agreement, the definitions set out in the WTO SPS 
Agreement shall prevail.  
Article 5  
Competent Authorities  
For the purpose of this Chapter, the competent authorities of each Party are those listed 
in [Annex 2]. The Parties shall inform each other of any change of these competent 
authorities.  
Article 6  
Application of SPS measures  
Except as provided for in Article 10[Adaptation to regional conditions] each Party shall 
apply its sanitary or phytosanitary import conditions to the entire territory of the other 
Party. Where harmonised import conditions exist in one Party, these conditions shall 
apply to the entire territory of the exporting Party. Without prejudice to Article 10 [Ad-
aptation to regional conditions] each Party shall ensure that products which are in 
conformity with these import conditions can be placed on the market and used in its 
entire territory on the basis of a single authorisation, approval or certificate.  
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Article 7  
Trade facilitation/conditions  
Sanitary and phytosanitary import procedures  
1. Sanitary and phytosanitary procedures shall be established with the objective to 
minimise negative trade effects and to simplify and expedite the approval and clear-
ance process while ensuring the fulfilment of the importing Party’s requirements.  
2. The Parties shall ensure that all sanitary and phytosanitary procedures affecting 
trade between the parties are undertaken and completed without undue delay and that 
they are not applied in a manner which would constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination against the other Party.  
General sanitary and phytosanitary import requirements  
3. The importing Party shall make available information about sanitary and phytosani-
tary import requirements and conditions and about the import authorisation process, 
including complete details about the mandatory administrative steps, expected time-
lines, and authorities in charge of receiving import applications and of processing 
them.  
4. In accordance with applicable standards agreed under the International Plant Pro-
tection Convention (IPPC) the Parties undertake to maintain adequate information on 
their pest status (including surveillance, eradication and containment programmes and 
their results) in order to support the categorization of pests and to justify import phyto-
sanitary measures.  
5. The Parties shall establish lists of regulated pests for commodities where a phytosan-
itary concern exists. The list shall contain:  
a) the pests not known to occur within any part of its own territory; 
b) the pests known to occur within any part of its own territory and under official con-
trol; 
c) the pests known to occur within any part of its own territory, under official control 
and for which pest free areas are established. 
6. For commodities for which a phytosanitary concern exists, import requirements shall 
be limited to measures ensuring the absence of regulated pests of the importing Party. 
Such import requirements shall be applicable to the entire territory of the exporting 
Party.  
Specific sanitary and phytosanitary import requirements  
7. The Parties shall ensure that tolerances and maximum residue levels adopted by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission after the entry into force of this Agreement will be 
applied by each Party without undue delay unless the importing Party had signalled a 
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reservation in the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Such tolerances and maximum 
residue levels, shall apply between the Parties within 12months after their adoption. 
8. Where it is necessary to establish specific import requirements, such as model certif-
icates, the importing Party shall take the necessary legislative and administrative steps 
to allow trade to take place without undue delay and normally within one year. In order 
to establish specific import requirements, the exporting Party shall, upon request of the 
importing Party:  
a) provide all relevant information required by the importing Party; and 
b) give reasonable access to the importing Party for inspection, testing, audit and other 
relevant procedures.  
9. The importing Party shall make available a list of commodities for which it is re-
quired to conduct a Pest Risk Analysis prior to the authorisation of imports. Pest risk 
analyses shall be carried out as promptly as possible and normally within one year of a 
request being made.  
10. Where a range of alternative sanitary or phytosanitary measures may be available 
to attain the appropriate level of protection of the importing Party, the Parties shall, 
upon request of the exporting Party, establish a technical dialogue with a view to se-
lecting the most practicable and least trade-restrictive solution.  
Trade facilitation  
11. Where it is necessary for the importation of a product that an establishment or 
facility be included on a list by the importing Party, the importing Party shall approve 
such establishments or facilities which are situated on the territory of the exporting 
Party within [one month] and without prior inspection of individual establishments or 
facilities if:  
a) the exporting Party has requested such an approval for a given establishment or 
facility, accompanied by the appropriate guarantees, and 
b) the conditions and procedures set out in [Annex VI] are fulfilled.  
The importing Party shall make its lists publicly available.  
12. Without prejudice to existing arrangements at the time of entry into force of this 
Agreement and unless the Parties agree otherwise, consignments of regulated commod-
ities shall be accepted on the basis of adequate guarantees by the exporting Party, 
without:  
a) Pre-clearance programmes. Control activities at the country of origin performed by 
the NPPO of the country of destination should not be applied as a permanent import 
measure and only foreseen to facilitate new trade. On a voluntary basis, the NPPO of 
the country of origin may request pre-clearance within the inspection activities carried 
out by the importing countries as a trade facilitation tool; 
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b) Import licences or import permits; 
c) Phytosanitary protocols or work plans prescribed by the importing party. 
13. Each Party shall ensure that products exported to the other Party meet the appro-
priate level of protection of the importing Party. The responsibility for the implementa-
tion of adequate control measures and inspections lies with the exporting Party. The 
importing Party may require that the relevant competent authority of the exporting 
Party objectively demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the importing Party, that the import 
requirements are fulfilled.  
Article 8  
Elimination of redundant control measures  
1. The Parties recognise each other’s competent authorities as responsible to ensure 
that establishments, facilities and products eligible for exports meet the applicable 
sanitary or phytosanitary requirements of the importing Party.  
2. The importing Party shall accept establishments or facilities that were authorised 
and listed by the exporting Party without re-inspection, third party certification or any 
other, additional guarantees.  
Article 9  
Equivalence  
1. The importing Party shall accept sanitary and phytosanitary measures of the export-
ing Party as equivalent to its own if the exporting Party objectively demonstrates to the 
importing Party that its measure achieves the importing Party’s appropriate level of 
protection.  
2. Equivalence may be recognised in relation to an individual measure and/or groups 
of measures and/or systems applicable to a sector or part of a sector. For the determina-
tion, recognition and maintenance of equivalence the Parties shall follow the principles 
set out in the available guidance of international standard setting bodies1 recognised 
by the WTO SPS Agreement, as well as in the provisions of [Annex IV], where applica-
ble.  
3. The final determination whether a sanitary measure maintained by an exporting 
Party achieves the importing Party’s appropriate level of sanitary protection rests solely 
with the importing Party acting in accordance with its administrative and legislative 
framework.  
4. Where the importing Party has concluded a positive equivalence determination, the 
importing Party shall take the necessary legislative and/or administrative measures to 
implement it without undue delay and normally within six months.  
Internationally agreed guidelines include, but are not limited to Guidelines of Codex 
Alimentarius on the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures associated with 
Food Inspection and Certification Systems CAC/GL 53-2003; International Standard for 
Frode Veggeland and Stine Evensen Sørbye 
 
62 
Phytosanitary Measures ISPM 24 Guidelines for the determination and recognition of 
equivalence of phytosanitary measures.  
5. If necessary and objectively justified, the Parties may identify special conditions 
which, in combination with the exporting Party’s measures, will achieve the importing 
Party’s appropriate level of protection.  
6. [Annex V] sets out:  
a) The areas for which the importing Party recognises that the measures of the export-
ing Party are equivalent to its own, and 
b) The areas for which the importing Party recognises that the fulfilment of the speci-
fied special conditions, combined with the exporting Party’s measures, achieve the 
importing Party’s appropriate level of protection. 
7. The Parties may agree on simplified sanitary or phytosanitary certificates for prod-
ucts for which equivalence has been recognised.  
Article 10  
Adaptation to regional conditions  
Animals, animal products and animal by-products  
1. The Parties recognise the principle of zoning which they agree to apply in their trade.  
2. The importing Party shall recognise the health status of zones, as determined by the 
exporting Party, with respect to the animal and aquaculture diseases specified in [An-
nex II].  
3. Without prejudice to Article 16 [Emergency measures] the importing Party shall 
recognise zoning decisions taken by the exporting Party in accordance with the criteria 
set out in [Annex III] where an area is affected by one or more of the diseases listed in 
[Annex II].  
4. The exporting Party shall, if requested by the importing Party, provide full explana-
tion and supporting data for the determinations and decisions covered by this Article 
and may request technical consultations in accordance with Article 15 [Technical con-
sultation ]. The importing Party shall assess the information within 15 working days 
following receipt. Any verification the importing party may request shall be carried out 
in accordance with Article 11 [Audit and verification] and within 25 working days 
following receipt of the request for verification. The Parties shall endeavour to avoid 
unnecessary disruption to trade.  
5. Where a Party considers that a specific region has a special status with respect to a 
specific disease other than those in [Annex II] and which fulfils the criteria laid down in 
the OIE Terrestrial Code Chapter 1.2, it may request recognition of this status. . The 
importing Party may also request additional guarantees in respect of imports of live 
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animals and animal products appropriate to the agreed status. The guarantees for spe-
cific diseases are specified in [Annex IV].  
6. The Parties also recognise the concept of compartmentalisation and agree to cooper-
ate on this matter.  
Plants and plant products  
7. Without prejudice to Article 16 [Emergency measures] each Party shall recognize the 
phytosanitary status of the exporting Party as determined by the exporting Party in 
accordance with the following provisions:  
a) The Parties recognize the concepts of Pest Free Areas, Pest Free Places of Production 
and Pest Free Production Sites, as well as areas of low pest prevalence as specified in 
relevant FAO/IPPC International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM), and of 
Protected Zones according to Council Directive 2000/29/EC, which they agree to apply 
in their trade. 
b) When establishing or maintaining phytosanitary measures, the importing Party shall 
take into account pest free areas, pest free places of production, pest free production 
sites, areas of low pest prevalence, as well as protected zones established by the export-
ing Party. 
c) The exporting Party shall identify Pest Free Areas, Pest Free Places of Production, 
Pest Free Production Sites, Protected Zones or areas of low pest prevalence to the other 
Party and, upon request, provide a full explanation and supporting data as provided for 
in the relevant ISPMs or otherwise deemed appropriate. Unless the importing Party 
raises an objection and requests consultations within 90 days, the regionalization 
decision so notified shall be understood as accepted. 
d) Consultations referred to in subparagraph (c) shall take place in accordance with 
Article 15[Technical consultations]. The importing Party shall assess additional infor-
mation requested within 90 days after receipt. Any verification the importing party may 
request shall be carried out in accordance with [Article 11Audit and verification] and 
within 12 months following receipt of the request for verification, taking into account 
the biology of the pest and the crop concerned.  
Article 11  
Audit and verification  
1. In order to maintain confidence in the effective implementation of the provisions of 
this Chapter, each Party has the right to carry out an audit or verification, or both, of all 
or part of the other Party's control system. Audits shall follow a systems based ap-
proach which relies on the examination of a sample of system procedures, documents 
or records and, where required, a selection of sites.  
2. The nature and frequency of audits and verifications shall be determined by the 
importing Party taking into account the inherent risks of the product the track record of 
Frode Veggeland and Stine Evensen Sørbye 
 
64 
past import checks and other available information, such as audits and inspections 
undertaken by the competent authority of the exporting party.  
3. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the importing Part shall endeavour to rely on audits 
and verifications undertaken by the competent authority of the exporting Party.  
4. Audits and verifications shall be conducted in accordance with [Annex VII] and in 
line with internationally agreed Guidelines2.  
5. Verification procedures may include, but are not limited to:  
a) an assessment of all or part of the exporting Party's total control programme, includ-
ing, where appropriate, reviews of the exporting Party's inspection and audit pro-
grammes, and 
b) on-site checks and inspections of a selection of sites within the scope of the audit. 
6. For the European Union, the European Commission will carry out the verification 
procedures provided for in paragraph 1. The US agencies identified in [Annex I] shall 
facilitate the performance of these verification procedures by the Commission.  
7. The US agencies identified in Annex I will carry out the verification procedures pro-
vided for in paragraph 1 for the US. The European Union shall facilitate the perfor-
mance of these verification procedures by those agencies.  
8. Any measures taken as a consequence of audits and verifications shall be propor-
tionate to risks identified. If so requested, technical consultations regarding the situa-
tion shall be held in accordance with [Article 15 Technical Consultation]. The Parties 
shall consider any information provided through such consultations.  
9. Either Party may publish the results and conclusions of its verification procedures. 
10. Each Party shall bear its own costs associated with the audit or verification.  
Internationally agreed guidelines include, but are not limited to Codex Guidance doc-
ument for the design, operation, assessment and accreditation of food import and ex-
port inspection and certification systems (CAC/GL 26-1997); International Standards 
for Phytosanitary Measures ISPM 20: Guidelines for a phytosanitary import regulatory 
system.  
Article 12  
Export certificates  
1. When a party requires an export certificate for the importation of a product, this shall 
be based on the principles laid down in the international standards of the Codex Ali-
mentarius, the IPPC and the OIE.  
2. In respect of certification of plants, plant products and regulated commodities, the 
competent authorities shall apply the principles laid down in the FAO International 
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Standards for Phytosanitary Measures No 7 "Export Certification System" and No 12 
"Guidelines for Phytosanitary Certificates".  
3. When an official health certificate is required for the importation of a consignment of 
live animals or animal products and if the importing Party has accepted the measures 
of the exporting Party as equivalent to its own, the Parties shall use simplified model 
health attestations prescribed in [Annex VIII], unless the Parties jointly decide other-
wise. The Parties may also define model attestations for other products if they so jointly 
decide in accordance with [Article 18 Joint Management Committee].  
4. Original certificates or other original documents may either be transmitted by mail or 
by secure methods of electronic data transmission that offer equivalent certification 
guarantees. The Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of electronic certification 
procedures in accordance with the provisions described in [Annex VIII].  
Article 13  
Import checks and fees  
1. [Annex IX] sets out principles and guidelines for import checks and fees, including 
the frequency rate for import checks.  
2. In the event that import checks reveal non-compliance with the relevant import 
requirements, the action taken by the importing Party shall be based on an assessment 
of the risk involved, and shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to achieve the Party’s appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection.  
3. The importer of a non-compliant consignment, or its representative, and, on demand 
the competent authorities of the exporting Party shall be notified of the reason for non-
compliance, and be provided the opportunity to contribute relevant information to 
assist the importing Party in taking a final decision.  
4. Where the consignment is accompanied by a certificate, the importing Party shall 
inform the competent authority of the exporting Party in case of a rejection and provide 
all appropriate information, including detailed laboratory results and methods,. In the 
case of pest interceptions, the notification should indicate the pest at the species level.  
5. Upon request, in the case of an interception of regulated pests, the exporting Party 
shall provide information about monitoring and possible mitigation measures under-
taken.  
6. Any fees imposed for the procedures on imported products from the exporting Party 
shall not be higher than the actual cost of the service.  
7. Inspections carried out in accordance with [Article 7(130 Preclearance] shall only be 
conducted in exceptional cases and with the understanding that they are temporary 
measures to build confidence. Fees and other costs of such inspections shall be borne 
by the importing party. 
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Article 14  
Transparency Notification:  
1. Each Party shall notify the other Party without undue delay of:  
a) Significant changes in pest/disease status, such as the presence and evolution of 
diseases in [Annex II Process of Recognition of Regional Conditions];  
b) changes in their respective sanitary or phytosanitary measures; 
c) findings of epidemiological importance with respect to animal diseases, which are 
not in Annex II; or which are new diseases;  
d) significant food safety issues relating to products traded between the Parties; and 
e) any significant changes to the structure and organisation of their competent authori-
ties. 
Information exchange:  
2. The Parties will endeavour to exchange information on other relevant issues includ-
ing:  
a) on request, the results of a Party’s official controls and a report concerning the re-
sults of the controls carried out; 
b) the results of import checks provided for in Article 13[Import checks and fees]in case 
of rejected or non-compliant consignments of products;  
c) on request, risk analyses and scientific opinions, relevant to this Chapter and pro-
duced under the responsibility of a Party. 
3. Unless otherwise decided by the Committee referred to in Article 18 [Joint manage-
ment committee], when the information referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 has been made 
available via notification to the WTO or relevant international standard setting body in 
accordance with the relevant rules, the requirements in paragraphs 1 and 2 as they 
apply to that information are fulfilled.  
Article 15  
Technical consultation  
Where a Party has significant concerns regarding food safety, plant health, or animal 
health, or regarding a measure proposed or implemented by the other Party, that Party 
can request technical consultations. The other Party should respond to such a request 
without undue delay and normally within 15 days. Each Party shall endeavour to pro-
vide all relevant information necessary to avoid unnecessary disruption to trade and to 
reach a mutually acceptable solution. Consultations may be held by audio- or video 
conference.  
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Article 16  
Emergency measures  
1. The importing Party may, on serious grounds, provisionally take emergency 
measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant health.  
2. Emergency measures shall be notified to the other Party within 24 hours after the 
decision to implement them and, on request, technical consultations regarding the 
situation shall be held in accordance with Article 15 [Technical consultation]. The 
Parties shall consider the information provided through such consultations.  
3. The importing Party shall:  
a) Consider information provided, by the exporting Party when making decisions with 
respect to consignments that, at the time of adoption of emergency measures, are being 
transported between the Parties; 
b) Consider the most suitable and proportionate solution for consignments in transport 
between the Parties, in order to avoid unnecessary disruptions to trade and  
c) Revise or repeal, without undue delay, the emergency measures or replace them by 
permanent measures with a view to avoid unnecessary trade disruption.  
Article 17  
Animal welfare  
1. The Parties recognise that animals are sentient beings. They undertake to respect 
trade conditions for live animals and animal products that are aimed to protect their 
welfare.  
2. The Parties undertake to exchange information, expertise and experiences in the 
field of animal welfare with the aim to align regulatory standards related to breeding, 
holding, handling, transportation and slaughter of farm animals.  
3. The Parties will strengthen their research collaboration in the area of animal welfare 
to develop adequate and science-based animal welfare standards related to animal 
breeding and the treatment of animals on the farm, during transport and at slaughter.  
4. In accordance with Article 19 [Collaboration in international fora (multilateral and 
bilateral)] the Parties undertake to collaborate in international fora with the aim to 
promote the further development of good animal welfare practices and their implemen-
tation.  
5. The Committee described in Article [18 Joint management committee] may appoint a 
working group to implement this provision. 
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Article 18  
Joint management committee  
1. The Parties hereby establish a Joint Management Committee (JMC) for SPS Measures, 
hereafter called the Committee, comprising regulatory and trade representatives of 
each Party who have responsibility for SPS measures.  
2. The functions of the Committee include:  
a) To monitor the implementation of this Chapter and to consider any matter relating to 
this Chapter, and to examine all matters which may arise in relation to its implementa-
tion; 
b) To provide direction for the identification, prioritization, management and resolu-
tion of issues; 
c) To address any requests by the Parties for the modification of import checks; 
d) To review the Annexes to this Agreement; 
e) To provide a regular forum for exchanging information relating to each Party’s regu-
latory system, including the scientific basis; 
f) To prepare and maintain a document detailing the state of discussions between the 
Parties on their work on recognition of the equivalence of specific SPS measures. 
3. In addition, the Committee may, inter alia:  
a) identify opportunities for greater bilateral engagement, including enhanced rela-
tionships, which may include exchanges of officials; 
b) discuss at an early stage, changes to, or proposed changes to, measures being  con-
sidered; 
c) facilitate improved understanding between Parties related to the  implementation of  
the WTO SPS Agreement, promoting cooperation between Parties on SPS issues under 
discussion in multilateral fora, including the WTO SPS Committee and international 
standard-setting bodies, as appropriate;  
d) identify and discuss, at an early stage, initiatives that have an SPS component and 
would benefit from cooperation. 
4. The Committee may establish working groups consisting of expert-level representa-
tives of the Parties, to address specific SPS issues. When additional expertise is needed, 
participants from non-governmental organisations may be included, with the agree-
ment of the parties.  
5. A Party may refer any SPS issue to the Committee. The Committee should consider 
any matter referred to it as expeditiously as possible.  
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6. [In the event that the Committee is unable to resolve an issue expeditiously, the 
Committee shall, upon request of a Party, report promptly to the [TTIP Oversight Body]. 
Pending outcome of institutional chapter]  
7. Unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Committee shall meet and establish its work 
programme no later than six months following the entry into force of this Agreement, 
and its rules of procedure no later than one year after the entry into force of this 
Agreement.  
8. Following its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet as required, normally on an 
annual basis. If agreed by the Parties, a meeting of the Committee may be held by vide-
oconference or teleconference. The Committee may also address issues out of session 
by correspondence.  
9. The Committee shall report annually on its activities and work programme to the 
[TTIP Oversight Body]. Pending outcome of institutional chapter]  
10. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, each Party shall designate and inform the 
other Party of a Contact Point to coordinate the Committee’s agenda and to facilitate 
communications on SPS matters.  
Article 19  
Collaboration in international fora (multilateral and bilateral)  
The Parties will collaborate in the international standard setting bodies (OIE, Codex 
Alimentarius, IPPC, etc.), with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory outcomes.  
Article 20  
Recognition and termination of the Veterinary Agreement  
The Parties recognise the achievements that have been accomplished under the 
Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the United States 
of America on sanitary measures to protect public and animal health in respect of trade 
in live animals and animal products (the Veterinary Agreement) and confirm their 
intention to continue this work under the framework of this Agreement. [This Veteri-
nary Agreement of 21 April 1998, as amended, is terminated from the date of entry into 
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